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THE  WORLD ECONOMY entered a period of stagflation  during  the 1970s. 
Markedly slower growth combined with rates of unemployment  and 
inflation  that were unprecedentedly  high for the postwar era, and the 
slowdown persists to this day. In this paper  we draw  on a larger  study 
of the deceleration  of potential growth to emphasize the contributory 
role of demand  shortfalls  in prolonging  and  deepening  the adjustment  to 
lower growth rates of productivity  and real wages. A key issue is the 
relative  importance  of high real wages and deficient  aggregate  demand 
as proximate  causes of the rise of unemployment. 
We use the theoretical  approach  developed by Hickman  to estimate 
the classical  and  Keynesian  components  of excess unemployment  in the 
United States, Germany,  Austria, and the United Kingdom.1  The ap- 
proach  is closely related  to the "wage gap" analysis of Michael  Bruno 
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and  Jeffrey  Sachs, but  it differs  in  building  on the assumption  of imperfect 
competition  and cost minimization  rather  than perfect competition  and 
profit  maximization  as the basis for labor  demand.2  Similarly,  it differs 
from  the  general  disequilibrium  or  non-market-clearing  models  of Robert 
Barro  and Herschel Grossman  and Edmond  Malinvaud  in that it allows 
for coexistence of classical and Keynesian unemployment  instead of 
explaining  them as separate  regimes  in markets  with price-taking  firms 
and  rationed  buyers  and sellers.3 
Our empirical measures of the wage and demand components of 
employment are computed from a conditional demand function for 
aggregate  man-hours,  with the real  wage and  output  treated  as predeter- 
mined to the employment  decisions of firms. Since the real wage and 
aggregate  demand  are  in  reality  endogenous  variables,  the  decomposition 
deals only with their relative importance as proximate sources of 
unemployment.  A deeper approach  would employ a complete macro- 
economic model endogenizing aggregate output and real wages and 
capable  of explaining  the evolution of both as a function  of exogenous 
shocks to aggregate  supply and demand, as recommended  by Robert 
Solow.4 That would be feasible in our U.S. model, which is just such a 
complete system, but not in the truncated  supply-side  models we have 
estimated  for the European  countries  in the study. 
Concepts of Keynesian and Classical Unemployment 
The standard  fixed-price  or non-market-clearing  model  distinguishes 
Keynesian  and  classical  unemployment  states as separate  regimes  under 
fixed wage and price levels by incorporating  quantity  constraints  into 
the optimization  problems  of firms  and  households.5 
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The representative  firm  is a price taker  in its markets  for inputs and 
output. It maximizes profits subject to  a well-behaved production 
function, Y =  F(K,L),  and a product demand constraint, Y c  Y. For 
fixed  K in the short  run, the optimal  solution  for L is the min-equation 
(1)  Ld =  min[F- 1 (Y,K), FL 1  (WIP,K)], 
where WIP  is the real product  wage. 
The unconstrained  or notional short-run  functions  for labor demand 
and  product  supply  are 
(2)  Ld  =  FL1 (WIP,K), 
given by the first-order  marginal  productivity  condition,  and 
(3)  ys =  F(Ld,K). 
The classical labor  supply  function  is 
(4)  Ls = Ls(W/P), 
where the real wage equates the marginal  disutility of effort and the 
marginal  utility  of consumption. 
With  flexible wages and prices, a Walrasian  solution of equations 2 
and 4 would yield full employment  at the equilibrium  real wage. With 
fixed wages and prices, however, if notional supply exceeds effective 
demand  at the given price, the sales of firms  are rationed  in the product 
market. Labor demand  is then output-constrained  and is smaller  than 
labor  supply  at the existing  real  wage, resulting  in Keynesian  unemploy- 
ment: 
(5)  Ld = F-1  (Y,K) < Ls (WIP). 
Thus Keynesian  unemployment  is the spillover  effect of disequilibrium 
in the product  market. 
Classical unemployment  may occur if the fixed price is below the 
Walrasian  equilibrium  level. Effective demand then exceeds notional 
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supply. Firms have no incentive to increase supply at the existing real 
wage, so the short side of the market prevails and households are 
rationed.  Firms  are unconstrained  and operating  on their  notional  labor 
demand  and output supply schedules, but since the real wage exceeds 
the Walrasian  level, labor demand  falls short of full-employment  labor 
supply. 
In both unemployment  states households  are constrained  in the labor 
market,  and hence effective demand  falls short of the notional  demand 
that would result from unconstrained  utility maximization.  Indeed, as 
Robert Clower showed, it is because of the spillover from the labor 
market constraint that income is  an argument in the consumption 
function.6 
However, the approach  of this paper modifies the standard  fixed- 
price model, in which prices are  fixed over the period  being  analyzed,  in 
two principal  respects. First, we assume imperfect competition with 
firms setting prices in the face of uncertain  demand. We assume that 
prices are not continually  adjusted. Second, firms choose capital and 
labor inputs so as to minimize  the cost of producing  the quantity  they 
expect to sell at the price they have set. 
The assumption  of imperfect  competition  is adopted  for both theoret- 
ical and empirical  reasons. Perfect competition  among  atomistic  price- 
taking  firms  is incompatible  with the fixed-price  assumption  except for 
very short  adjustment  periods  after  unexpected  shocks. As an empirical 
matter, moreover, auction markets are largely limited to agricultural 
products  and primary  metals. There  is also solid econometric  evidence 
of the  ubiquitous  existence of cost-based  price  setting,  with  only a limited 
scope for markup  variations  in response to shifts in product  demand.7 
One important  consequence of cost-based price setting is that it 
reduces the sensitivity of real wages to changes in effective demand. 
Increases  or decreases in nominal  wages induced  by shifts in aggregate 
demand  induce  price  movements  in  the same  direction,  greatly  mitigating 
the response of real wages to demand  pressures in labor markets. In 
contrast,  supply  shocks that  directly  raise production  costs, such as the 
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energy shocks of the 1970s, have greater potential to alter real wage 
rates  unless they are offset by prompt  and substantial  wage indexation. 
As a corollary  to real  wage inflexibility  under  markup  pricing,  macro- 
economic models, including  our own, that incorporate  the hypothesis 
generally  depend  for  their  equilibrating  properties  on absolute  variations 
in the wage-price  level, operating  through  the Phillips  curve  and  markup 
mechanisms. In the standard textbook IS-LM model, for example, 
restoration  of long-term  equilibrium  after a shock depends on price- 
induced  changes  in the real  money supply  and  interest  rates.8  In some of 
the larger  econometric  models, real wealth arguments  in the aggregate 
demand  functions  are also involved.9 
Market  imperfections  provide a theoretical rationale  for the fixed- 
price assumption.  One theoretical  rationale  is the perceived  asymmetry 
of competitors'  responses  to a firm's  potential  price  increase  or decrease 
in oligopolistic industries as the source of price rigidity, as in Paul 
Sweezy's theory of the kinked demand curve.10  Similarly,  in Takashi 
Negishi's conjectural  equilibrium  model of atomistic  firms,  a kink  in the 
perceived  demand  schedule  exists because of the asymmetric  reactions 
of consumers  to price changes: "Lower prices asked by a supplier  may 
not  be fully  advertised  to customers  currently  buying  from  other  suppliers 
who are maintaining  their  current  price, while a higher  price charged  by 
the same supplier necessarily induces present customers to leave in 
search of lower price suppliers."  II Imperfect  information  and search 
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processes are also central  to Arthur  Okun's  customer  shopping  model, 
with added stress on the desire of sellers to maintain  strong  long-term 
customer  attachment  to their  products  by forgoing  price adjustments  to 
temporary  demand fluctuations.12  In all these formulations, shifts in 
demand  initially  lead to a change  in the quantity  sold at the current  price 
and may leave the price permanently  unaffected;  thus they provide a 
justification  for the fixed-price  or rigid-price  model that  is used here. 
Under  imperfect  competition,  the firm  expects to sell output Y  when 
it sets price at P.  Expected revenue is predetermined,  and the firm 
minimizes  production  costs to determine  factor demands.  For fixed K, 
L will again  be given by the inverted  production  function  as in equation 
5. If substitution  of capital  and  labor  is taken  into account, however, the 
labor  demand  function  becomes conditional  on the wage-rental  ratio as 
well as on output: 
(6)  Ld =  Ld (W/Q,Y). 
The replacement  of the inverted  production  function  in equation  5 by 
the conditional  labor  demand  function,  equation  6, is the key to the new 
method  of allocating  unemployment  in this paper.  Since the rental  price 
of capital, Q, includes the price of capital goods (P1) along with the 
discount and depreciation rates, labor demand depends on the real 
investment  wage (WIPI),  as well as on output,  in contrast  to the discrete 
classical and Keynesian dichotomy in equation 1. Labor demand can 
therefore  fall short of full-employment  labor supply because effective 
demand  is too low or  because  the  real  wage  is too high,  or  both.  Keynesian 
and classical unemployment  may coexist rather  than  occurring  in sepa- 
rate regimes as in the standard  fixed-price  disequilibrium  model. Clas- 
sical unemployment  is ruled out as a discrete state with firms  on their 
notional supply schedules and households rationed off their demand 
schedules, but it may still occur in the absence of Keynesian  unemploy- 
ment provided  that a positive wage gap-with  the real wage above the 
full-employment  level-exists  without  an accompanying  demand  short- 
fall. 
We follow established terminology in referring  to unemployment 
attributable  to a positive wage gap as classical and unemployment  due 
to deficient  effective  demand  as Keynesian.  It is true  that  our  imperfectly 
12.  Arthur M. Okun, Prices and Quantities: A Macroeconomic  Analysis  (Brookings, 
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competitive setup allows for the coexistence of both components, but 
that is not fundamentally  different from the Keynesian state of the 
competitive model, which requires only that firms be demand-con- 
strained,  so that  employment  is determined  from  the inverted  production 
function  under  the min-condition  in equation  1.  If, in addition  to a binding 
demand  constraint,  the real  wage also exceeds the Walrasian  level in the 
competitive  model, restoration  of full employment  will require  that the 
real wage gap as well as the demand gap be eliminated. This is the 
distinction  made by Barro  and Grossman  between Keynesian involun- 
tary unemployment  due to inadequate  product demand with the real 
wage  at or  below  the Walrasian  level, and  any  latent  classical  involuntary 
unemployment  due to a concurrent  wage gap.13  Similarly,  Jean Pascal 
Benassy notes that  in the foregoing  circumstance,  it would  be necessary 
to increase aggregate  demand  and decrease the real wage to suppress 
unemployment  totally, so that "both classical and Keynesian  measures 
would  be necessary."  14 
There  are  nonetheless  important  differences  between  the competitive 
model and our approach.  In the classical unemployment  regime of the 
competitive  model, a positive real wage gap forecloses any increase of 
employment  from  expansionary  demand  policies. Excess demand  exists 
for goods,  and any additional demand stimulus could not improve 
employment,  since profits  are already  maximized  at the current  wage- 
price  configuration  and  capital  stock. Similarly,  if an inflexible  wage gap 
accompanies  the Keynesian demand-constrained  regime, the classical 
component  of excess unemployment  cannot  be eliminated  by a demand 
stimulus. 
In the imperfectly  competitive  model, by contrast,  the labor  demand 
function  is shifted  directly  by changes  in output,  and  hence the classical 
component  of unemployment  can be offset by high  effective demand,  as 
happened  often in Austria and occasionally in the United States and 
Germany  according  to our empirical  results. A positive wage gap is not 
necessarily  an  impenetrable  barrier  to eliminating  excess unemployment 
by demand  management,  although  there may be limitations  and draw- 
backs  to such a policy, as discussed later. 
The difference  in the assumption  about  whether  the real  wage affects 
output makes a big difference to the elasticity of employment with 
13. Barro  and  Grossman,  "A General  Disequilibrium  Model," pp. 86-87. 
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respect to the real wage. As will be shown later, employment  is much 
more  responsive  to a wage change  under  the competitive  case. 
To elucidate  key features  of our approach,  it is best to abstract  from 
complicating aspects of  the empirical models. Let us  assume, for 
simplicity,  that the full-employment  labor  supply  is exogenously given. 
The magnitude  of classical unemployment  then depends on the size of 
the real wage gap and on the elasticity of labor  demand  with respect to 
the real wage. To establish the size of the wage gap, we must first 
determine  the full-employment  equilibrium  value of the real wage and 
the corresponding  level of output-that is, potential  output.  Our  concept 
of full-employment  equilibrium  is based not on labor  market  clearance 
at a given capital stock, as in the short-run  competitive model above, 
but on capital as well as labor market  equilibrium.  That is, it assumes 
that profits would be maximized if firms were operating at the full- 
employment  equilibrium.  The full-employment  real wage must be con- 
sistent not only with full employment  of labor  but also with attainment 
of a required  marginal  rate  of return  on capital. 
The nature  of the full-employment  equilibrium  is most transparent  if 
we neglect  technical  progress  and  expectational  and  adjustment  lags, all 
of which  play  important  roles  in our  empirical  models.  As in  the empirical 
models, we assume that the aggregate  production  function is Cobb- 
Douglas  with constant  returns  to scale: 
(7)  Y=  KaLl-o. 
Firms  choose inputs  to minimize  costs, so that  the optimal  inputs  satisfy 
the expansion  path  equation: 
(8)  W/Q =  [(1 -ot)/ot](KL), 
where Q is the implicit  rental  price of capital. If there are no taxes, and 
if there  is a homogeneous  output  that  can either  be consumed  or be used 
as capital, then Q = P(R + d), where P is the price of output,  R is the 
rate of return  on capital,  and d is the depreciation  rate. Then  equation  8 
can be written  in terms  of the real  wage as 
(9)  WIP =  [(1 -  o0)/oi(K/L)  (R +  d). 
In an imperfectly  competitive  equilibrium,  the value of output  exceeds 
total factor costs, and national  income can therefore be expressed as 
PY  =  A [WL +  QK], where X >  1 and depends on the price elasticity Robert M.  Coen and Bert G. Hickman  131 
of demand.  Solving  the national  income equation  for the rate of return, 
we obtain 
(10)  R =  (PY -  XWL -  APdK)/APK  =  (Y/XK) -  (WL/PK) -  d. 
Substituting  from  equation  9 for (WL/PK)  gives 
(11)  R =  ot(Y/XK)  -  d. 
Thus  the net return  R equals  the marginal  revenue  product  of capital  net 
of depreciation. 
Setting R  =  r, the required rate of return, and L =  LJs,  the given full- 
employment  labor supply, equations 7, 9, and 11 determine  the full- 
employment  real  wage, potential  output,  and  potential  capital,  the latter 
being the capital stock that yields the return  r when employment  is Ls 
and the real wage satisfies equation  9. Denoting  the solution values by 
asterisks,  we have 
(12)  Y* =  [oJA(r  +  d)]a/(la-)Ls 
(13)  K* =  [otA(r + d)]  1/(1  -  )LS 
(14)  (W/P)* =  (1 -  ox)[ox/(r  +  dJ]a/(1a)  (/- 
The smaller the required return on capital and the larger the full- 
employment  labor supply, the larger are potential output and capital 
stock. The equilibrium  real  wage also depends  inversely  on the required 
return,  but it is independent  of the exogenous labor  supply. It is easy to 
show that  the right-hand  side of equation  14  equals  the marginal  revenue 
product of labor, (1 -  x)(  Y/XL). 
The  full-employment  equilibrium  is depicted  graphically  in figure  1.15 
The isoquant  labeled YO*  refers to potential  output and the equilibrium 
inputs  are  KO*  and  Ls = L*, satisfying  the cost-minimizing  condition  that 
the marginal  rate of technical substitution  between L and K equals the 
wage-rental  ratio, (W/P)*[  I/(r + d)], or geometrically  that the slope of 
the isoquant  equals the slope of the isocost line tangent  to it at point  A. 
The  ray  through  A is the expansion-path  locus for which  the same  factor 
proportions  are optimal  for the same wage-rental  ratio at any scale of 
output. 
15. We are grateful  to James  Tobin  for discussions  that clarified  the analysis  and  led 
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Figure 1.  Theoretical Model of Components of Unemployment 
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Suppose now that the economy is operating  at point E on the lower 
isoquant labeled Y1 but at the  higher wage-rental ratio, given by 
(WIQ)1  = (WIP),  [1I(r  + d)] and indicated  by the higher  ray through  E. 
The new cost-minimizing  inputs  are related  to output  by the conditional 
factor  demand  functions: 
(15)  L2  =  [ci/(1  -  0X)]at  (WIQ)v a Y1, 
(16)  K2 =  [a/(1 -  c )]1-  (I/Q)(i-o)  y 
(We are momentarily  neglecting  lagged  adjustments  of factor  inputs.)  In 
this situation  the observed wage gap is (WIP),  -  (WIP)*  and  unemploy- 
ment  equals  Lo -  L2. 
How responsive  would  employment  be to a reduction  of the real  wage 
to (WIP)*?  The answer is crucial, since it determines the estimated 
amount  of classical  unemployment  for  the given  wage  gap. One  approach Robert M.  Coen and Bert G. Hickman  133 
would  be to measure  the employment  change  conditional  on the level of 
capital  stock at E, as in the short-run  competitive  model. With  instanta- 
neous labor  adjustment  and an unconstrained  notional  supply  schedule, 
the short-run  wage  elasticity  of labor  demand  is - (1/x)  and  that  of output 
supply is  -  (1 -  ox)/ox  under the Cobb-Douglas technology.  Thus, given 
a reasonable  value of 0.25 for ox,  the implied  labor elasticity would be 
-4.  This large elasticity reflects the substantial  short-run  supply re- 
sponse of competitive  firms  (with  ot = 0.25, a 1 percent  reduction  in the 
real wage increases the supply of output by 3 percent) and implies 
employment  gaps several times the associated wage gaps. The crucial 
point  is that  these large  responses would occur only if competitive  firms 
were actually  on their notional supply schedules in a regime of excess 
demand  and that the wage gap would then be the sole cause of unem- 
ployment. 
In contrast, with the demand  constraint  prevailing  under imperfect 
competition  and  labor  demand  conditional  on output,  as in  our  behavioral 
interpretation  of point E, a decline in the real wage from (WIP), to 
(WIP)*  would  lead  firms  to raise  employment  to LI, associated  with  point 
B on the Y1  isoquant. Thus, our estimate of classical unemployment  is 
LI -  L2; this is the amount  that could be eliminated  by removing  the 
wage gap, given the level  of  aggregate demand. To  eliminate the 
remaining  unemployment,  Lo - L1, a higher  level of aggregate  demand 
is needed; hence, we refer to this component of unemployment  as 
Keynesian. 
From  our specification  of the labor  demand  function,  equation  15,  the 
wage  elasticity  of labor demand is  -ac  rather than  -(l/ox),  or  -0.25 
rather  than - 4. Classical  unemployment  from  an excessive real  wage is 
still possible and may even be dominant,  but the coexistence of wage 
and demand  components  of unemployment  is to be expected, and the 
division will depend on the particular  configuration  of real wages and 
effective demand.  Despite the "small" elasticity, the real  wage gap may 
be large  enough  to dominate  excess unemployment  occasionally or for 
several  years at a time, as will be shown in the empirical  results. 
Several important  observations  need to be made about our decom- 
position of unemployment.  First, the measure  of each component is a 
conditional  estimate. The classical component  assesses the effect of a 
lower real wage, conditional  on the observed level of demand;  it does 
not allow for possible effects of a reduced real wage on  Saggregate 134  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
demand.  Similarly,  the Keynesian  component  assesses the impact  of an 
increase in aggregate  demand,  conditional  on the real wage being at its 
full-employment  equilibrium  level; it does not allow for possible effects 
of an increase in aggregate  demand  on the real wage. By contrast, the 
classical component  of unemployment,  as usually defined,  includes the 
effects of high real wages in reducing  the quantity  of output that firms 
are willing  to supply  and  the related  employment. 
Second, the analysis  does not identify  the disturbances  that  depressed 
aggregate  demand,  raised  the  real  wage, and  thereby  moved  the economy 
from  A to E. The definitions  of the classical and Keynesian  components 
of unemployment  refer to the state or existence of the real wage and 
demand  gaps and not to the exogenous or endogenous  forces creating 
the gaps. As one illustration,  assume that an exogenous increase of 
money wages occurs at potential  output  without any adjustment  of the 
price level (contrary to markup  pricing behavior) or real aggregate 
demand.  Classical  unemployment  would then occur as employment  fell 
along the conditional  labor demand schedule for potential output, or 
equivalently, employment would fall from Lo to L3 as the economy 
moved to point  H on the potential  isoquant.  Now assume instead that a 
nominal  wage shock induces a less-than-proportional  increase  of prices 
in (at least) the short  run (perhaps  because invariant  price markups  are 
based on normal  instead of current  unit labor costs), so that the same 
rise in the real  wage rate  is accompanied  by a higher  price  level. With  an 
unchanged  money supply, the induced decline of real balances would 
reduce  effective demand  and  shift  the labor  demand  function  downward, 
adding  a Keynesian component  of unemployment  to the classical one, 
or equivalently, moving the economy to,  say, point E on the lower 
isoquant  where employment  would  be L2  instead  of L3.  Thus Keynesian 
unemployment  can arise  from  an  unaccommodated  supply  shock, owing 
to an induced  change  in effective demand.  Conversely,  an expansionary 
monetary  or fiscal  policy to reduce  Keynesian  unemployment  may  itself 
induce  a decrease  in  the real  wage  and  classical  unemployment,  provided 
nominal  wages are incompletely  indexed-or  the reverse could occur if 
indexation is  complete and the price markup varies strongly with 
demand.  16 
16. On this point, see Jeffrey  Sachs, "Real Wages  and Unemployment  in the OECD 
Countries,"  BPEA, 1:1983,  pp. 255-89, for an argument  and supporting  evidence that a 
demand  expansion  would  probably  raise  real  wage  growth  in Europe  under  the conditions 
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Third, although it is true that at points A, B, E, and H firms are 
employing  cost-minimizing  inputs for the given levels of demand  and 
factor prices, only A is a full macroeconomic  equilibrium.  Clearly  the 
labor  market  is in a state of excess supply  at the other  points. But points 
E and H have an additional  defect in that the realized  rate of return  on 
capital  is smaller  than the required  rate. To see this latter  point, recall 
that  the realized  rate  of return  is proportional  to the output-capital  ratio, 
since the marginal  product of capital is ox(YIK).  With our assumed 
technology,  the output-capital  ratio  is monotonically  related  to the labor- 
capital  ratio.  Since the labor-capital  ratio  is smaller  along  the ray  through 
E and  H than the ratio along the ray through  B and  A, the realized  rate 
of return  must also be smaller.  17 
In our imperfectly  competitive framework  in which firms are price 
setters, failure  to realize  the desired  rate  of return  should  lead producers 
to raise prices. If wages are imperfectly  indexed  to prices, the wage gap 
may be narrowed  and the realized rate of return  increased. However, 
the rise in the absolute price level may further depress the level of 
aggregate  demand  through  Keynes and  Pigou  effects. While  a complete 
macroeconomic  model  is obviously  required  to trace  these  repercussions 
of a wage gap, the less apparent  point  to note is that  classical  unemploy- 
ment presents a more complicated  problem  of macroeconomic  adjust- 
ment  than  does Keynesian  unemployment.  If the economy  were at point 
B experiencing only Keynesian unemployment, the required rate of 
return  would be realized, since the labor-capital  ratio is the same at B 
and A. A demand stimulus that left the real wage unchanged could 
restore  equilibrium  in both the labor  and  capital  markets.  By contrast,  if 
the economy were at E, a demand stimulus that left the real wage 
unchanged  could reduce the excess supply of labor, but it would not 
correct  the deficiency  in the rate  of return. 
Fourth, the absence of adjustment  lags in the foregoing exposition 
permits no distinction between short-run  and long-run  factor adjust- 
ments. However, adjustment  lags are central  features of our empirical 
models  and  substantially  affect  our  estimates  of classical  and  Keynesian 
17. If there  are separate  prices  for final  output  and capital  goods, as in our empirical 
models, then the realized rate of return would be R =  ot(PIPI)(YIXK)  -  d, where PI is the 
capital  goods price index, and  P is the price  of final  output.  In this case, R could remain 
unchanged  at a lower output-capital  ratio if the relative price of capital  goods declined 
sufficiently.  Investment  tax credits  or other  subsidies  could  also be used  to reduce  the real 
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unemployment.  To illustrate,  consider  once again  figure  1. Suppose  that 
the economy is operating  under  conditions  of full-employment  equilib- 
rium at point A, producing  the potential output YO  with the optimal 
inputs Lo and KO.  Assume that a demand shock reduces output to Y1 
without  affecting  the real wage, so that  the new desired  inputs  are given 
by K1  and  L1  at point  B. If the short  run  is defined  as a period  in which K 
cannot change and L fully adjusts, realized labor input would drop to 
point C, overshooting  the long-run  desired  level, and Keynesian  unem- 
ployment would equal A  -  C. In other words, full equilibrium  would 
require  a decrease in K to move the economy to B, so that "long-run" 
Keynesian  unemployment  is overstated  at point C. Since an equilibrium 
at C would require  a higher  wage-rental  ratio than at B, the horizontal 
distance between B and C is a kind of latent classical unemployment 
corresponding  to a latent wage gap. If an actual  wage gap accompanied 
the demand  gap, moreover,  so that  full equilibrium  were at E with labor 
input  L2, the true  classical  unemployment  component  would be L1 -  L2 
rather than the horizontal distance between C and L2, and classical 
unemployment  would  be understated  by the same amount  as Keynesian 
unemployment  was overstated. 
If one assumes, as we do, however, that adjustment  costs induce 
firms  to adjust  their  labor  inputs  only partially  in a given  year, Keynesian 
unemployment  will not overshoot. Moreover, any existing classical 
component  will always  be observable.  In the purely  Keynesian  case, for 
example, only part of the gap between Lo and L1  is closed and unem- 
ployment  is equal to, say, A -  D. Now assume that the real wage also 
increases when output  drops. This could occur independently  because 
of a wage or price shock, or it could be induced by the original  fall in 
aggregate  demand. In any event, the new desired inputs would differ 
and  might  be  given  by a point  like  E. If  we again  assume  partial  adjustment 
of the gap between the initial and the desired labor inputs, actual 
employment  will be at point F, smaller  than  D. Total unemployment  is 
A  -  F, of which the Keynesian  component  is A  -  D and the classical 
share isD  -  F. 
Note that owing to adjustment  costs, the observed, measured  quan- 
tities of K and  L are not constrained  to be on the production  function  in 
this system. However, the effective inputs  of capital  and labor services 
must be sufficient  to produce  the observed output. A given quantity  of 
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represent  a greater  or lesser amount  of labor services or effective input 
when  a man-hour  is used more  or  less intensively,  for  example  by altering 
the pace at which employees work or the number  or duration  of leisure 
breaks  during  a work shift. There  is an additional  degree  of freedom  for 
capital  input, since the measured  capital  stock may  be operated  not only 
faster  or slower per hour  but also more or fewer hours  per week. Thus, 
variations  in the intensity of factor utilization  (effective flow of factor 
services per measured  unit of input) occur in the process of adjusting 
measured  inputs  toward  the desired quantities.  On the assumption  that 
a firm  increases  its employment  of a factor  because it is using  the current 
amount  of the factor at greater  than normal  intensity, we posit that the 
intensities  of utilization  of K and  L are  proportional  to the discrepancies 
between the observed and desired magnitudes.18 Hence, if measured 
inputs  are at point  D while desired  inputs  are at point  B, both capital  and 
labor are underutilized  because firms  would like to reach a position in 
which they have less of both; if measured  inputs are at point F, while 
desired inputs are at point E,  labor is  underutilized  but capital is 
overutilized. 
Thus far we have focused on labor input, but the capital stock will 
also adjust  partially  toward the new desired value given by K, or K2. 
Some investment or disinvestment would occur on impact, but any 
incremental  stock is assumed not to become operative  until the end of 
the year, and similarly  any discards  are assumed  to occur at the end of 
the year, so that actual K is still fixed at Ko insofar as the production 
function  is concerned. Meanwhile,  the accelerator  effect of the output 
reduction  will tend to decrease current  investment  whereas the substi- 
tution  effect of the higher  wage-rental  ratio  will tend to increase  it. 19  As 
drawn  at point E, the substitution  effect is larger  and net investment  is 
positive. If the increase in the wage-rental ratio were smaller than 
assumed  in figure  1, however, so that K2  and L2  were at a point such as 
G along a lower expansion path, the output effect would be dominant 
and  investment  would  decrease  on balance.  In actual  practice,  an output 
shortfall  is apt to occur because rising current  output  lags the growing 
potential  level, instead  of falling  absolutely  as was assumed  for exposi- 
18.  Bert G.  Hickman  and Robert M.  Coen,  An Annual  Growth Model  of the  U.S. 
Economy  (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1976),  pp. 12-17. 
19. The  position  of the lower  isoquant  must  be consistent  with  the  induced  investment 
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tional  purposes  in figure  1, so that  both observed K and  observed  L will 
usually  lag the equilibrium  quantities  and  net investment  will usually  be 
positive. 
Let us now trace  through  the effects of a real wage shock of the same 
size as before, so as to avoid the need for cluttering  the diagram  with 
another expansion path ray, but this time disturbing  the original  full- 
employment  equilibrium.  If aggregate  demand  is unchanged,  the new 
equilibrium  will be at H and the partial  adjustment  of L would carry 
employment  to a point such as I, generating  classical unemployment  of 
A -  I. If the real wage increase were accompanied  by an independent 
or induced change in aggregate  demand  and output, however, the new 
equilibrium  would  be along  the expansion  path  through  H but  on a lower 
isoquant. For graphical  convenience only, it is assumed  that the lower 
isoquant  is again  at Y1  and  the desired  inputs  are again  given by point  E. 
Total  unemployment  would  then  again  be A -  F, with  a Keynesian  share 
of A  -  D  and a classical  component  of D  -  F  (smaller than A  -  I 
because the same proportional  wage gap as on the lower isoquant 
between E and B is applied  to a larger  output between H and A). The 
example  is restrictive  in that  the wage and  demand  gaps would be equal 
only by accident when the wage gap was induced by a demand shock 
and the demand gap by a wage shock, but it serves conveniently to 
illustrate  the proposition  that the concepts of classical and Keynesian 
unemployment  refer to economic states rather  than to the shocks or 
responses that  produced  them. 
An Empirical Disequilibrium  Growth Model 
Empirical  implementation  of our approach  to factoring Keynesian 
and classical unemployment  requires the specification of a dynamic 
structural  model of the labor  market  and  of the full-employment  path  of 
output  and  the real  wage. For the United States, we rely on the relevant 
sectors of the Hickman-Coen  Annual Growth Model, including its 
structure  of interrelated  factor  demands,  its disaggregated  model  of labor 
supply, and  its model of the natural  growth  path  of potential  output.20 
20. Robert  M. Coen and Bert G. Hickman,  "Constrained  Joint  Estimation  of Factor 
Demand and Production Functions,"  Review of Economics  and Statistics,  vol. 52 (August 
1970),  pp. 287-300;  Hickman  and Coen, An Annual  Growth  Model;  Coen and Hickman, 
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Although the U.S.  model is  a complete macroeconomic system 
combining  Keynesian  and  neoclassical  elements  and  allowing  for depar- 
tures  from  the  full-employment  growth  path  owing  to deviations  between 
effective demand  and supply, the new European  models are confined  to 
the supply-side equations and treat aggregate  demand and the wage- 
price level as exogenous variables  for the purposes  of the labor market 
simulations.  Correspondingly,  the empirical  results  for  the United  States 
are  derived  from  stand-alone  simulations  of the labor  sector  of our  annual 
growth  model, with expected output  and  the expected real  wage treated 
as predetermined  variables  in the labor  demand  function.  The derivation 
is justifiable  because the behavioral  assumptions  of the model conform 
to the imperfectly  competitive  paradigm  of the preceding  section. Firms 
set their  prices as a markup  over normal  unit  labor  cost, with allowance 
in the markup  for the costs of imported  inputs and the current  level of 
capacity utilization. For the given prices, output is determined by 
effective demand,  which  is disaggregated  into three  categories  of invest- 
ment, six of consumption,  federal  and  state  and  local  purchases,  exports, 
and imports. Nominal wages are determined  by an expectations-aug- 
mented Phillips curve. Since this paper is not concerned with output 
determination,  the inflation-unemployment  trade-off, or the absolute 
price level,  none of these sectors is operational in the subsequent 
analysis. 
The following sections describe the general forms of the empirical 
equations of the U.S.  model and note differences between the U.S. 
equations  and those of the European  nations. Estimates  of key parame- 
ters and elasticities are also reported.  The data are briefly  described  in 
footnotes to the tables and  text. A full listing  of the estimated  equations 
and  their  statistical  properties  is available  from  the authors. 
The Labor Market 
LABOR  SUPPLY 
The U.S.  model contains labor force participation  equations for 
sixteen  age-sex groups,  of the form 
Paper  80-15  (Institute  of Applied  Systems Analysis, Laxenburg,  Austria,  January  1980); 
Coen  and  Hickman,  "The Natural  Growth  Path  of Potential  Output,"  Working  Paper  80- 
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(17)  Lit  =  NNIit [alIE  +  a2,i (E/NNI)t +  a3,i (LAINNI)t 
+  a4,i(WATIPC)t  +  a5,AHt  +  a6,it +  a7,  NMRATjI, 
where  Li  is the labor  force and  NNIi the population  in the ith group,  E is 
aggregate  employment,  NNI is the noninstitutional  population  sixteen 
years of age or older, LA is the number  of persons in the armed  forces, 
WAT  is the after-tax  wage rate, PC is the implicit  deflator  for consumer 
goods, AH is aggregate  average hours of work, t is a time index, and 
NMRAT  is the ratio of males aged sixteen to thirty-four  to those aged 
thirty-five to sixty-four. The ratio E/NNI captures the discouraged 
worker  effect, whereas  NMRAT  is included  in the female participation 
equations  only, in conformity  with the hypothesis that  increases in this 
ratio affect the participation  rates of younger  women positively and of 
older  women negatively.21 
The single equation  for average  hours in the United States takes the 
form 
(18)  AHt =  exp[b1 +  b2l0g(WATIPC)t  +  b3logUt  +  b4logLWt], 
where AH is average  hours per year, U is the unemployment  rate, and 
LWis the proportion  of women aged  twenty and  over. Workers'  desired 
hours  are assumed  to depend  on the wage rate, but cyclical variations  in 
labor  demand,  proxied  here  by the unemployment  rate,  may  affect  actual 
hours. Average hours may also vary inversely with the proportion  of 
women in the labor force, since women are more likely than men to 
engage  in part-time  work. 
The labor supply model is completed by summing  over the relevant 
age-sex participation  equations  to obtain  L and  LW. 
The  same  general  specification  of labor  supply  is used  for  the  European 
countries,  except that  the demographic  disaggregation  differs,  the armed 
forces variable  is dropped  from  equation  17, and  the cyclical unemploy- 
ment variable  was found to be insignificant  in the hours equations  for 
Austria  and  Germany. 
LABOR  DEMAND 
The demands  for labor  and  capital  are  interrelated  in the model, since 
they arejointly  derived  on the assumption  that  firms  minimize  production 
21.  Richard A.  Easterlin,  What Will 1984 Be Like? Socioeconomic  Implications  of 
Recent Twists  in Age Structure  (Columbia  University  Press for the National  Bureau  of 
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costs subject  to along-run  orplanning  Cobb-Douglas  productionfunction 
with constant  returns  to scale: 
(19)  XNR * = AeP (K*)a (MHt*) a,  A,ot4  >  O, 
where  XNR*  is expected  output,  K*  is the desired  stock  of fixed  capital,22 
MH* is desired man-hours,  and 13  is the rate of Hicks-neutral  technical 
progress. 
Minimizing  production  cost subject  to equation 19  gives the long-run 
factor  demand  functions: 
(20)  MHt  =  [o(1  -  ox)]  -a A -[(W*IQ*)t]  -Y  XNR* e - Pt  and 
(21)  Kt  =  [o(l  -  o)]  I  -  A -[(W*IQ*)t](  -o) XNRt  e -  Pt, 
where Q* is the expected implicit  rental  price of capital and W*  is the 
expected nominal before-tax wage rate. The implicit rental price is 
defined  by Q  PI (r + d) T, where  PI is the investment  price  deflator,  r 
is the after-tax  rate  of return,  d is the depreciation  rate, and T  symbolizes 
the tax treatment  of investment  expenditure.23 
Adjustment  costs prevent  firms  from  accommodating  immediately  to 
variations  in the desired  inputs.  These adjustment  costs include  external 
purchase  costs and  internal  installation  costs for  capital  goods and  hiring, 
training,  and layoff costs for labor. They are represented  implicitly  by 
exponential  partial  adjustment  processes: 
(22)  MHt/MHt-I  =  MHt*I(MHt_1)f,  0 < f  1, 
22. Measured  by nonresidential  fixed capital for the United States and total fixed 
capital  for the European  countries.  See footnote  a, table 15,  for detailed  sources. 
23. For all countries,  the capital  goods price index is the implicit  deflator  for gross 
investment;  the economic depreciation  rate is the same as that used in constructing 
estimates  of net capital;  and the discount  rate is 6 percent  per annum.  Tax parameters 
required  in the measurement  of the rental  cost are based  on tax legislation  for the United 
States. For Germany,  these parameters  are adapted  from Patrick  Artus, Pierre-Alain 
Muet,  Peter  Palinkas,  and  Peter  Pauly,  "Tax  Incentives,  Monetary  Policy,  and  Investment 
in France  and Germany,"  in G. de Menil  and U. Westphal,  eds., Stabilization  Policy in 
France  and Germany  (Amsterdam:  Elsevier  Science Publishers,  1984);  Mervyn  A. King 
and Don Fullerton, eds.,  The Taxation of Income from Capital: A Comparative Study of 
the  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  Sweden,  and  West Germany  (University  of 
Chicago  Press, 1984).  For Austria,  they are adapted  from  a study  by Karl  Aiginger,  "Die 
industrieinvestionen  in  Oesterreich,  1955-1980,"  Industrieinvestionen  in  Oesterreich, 
Band 7/8 (Vienna: Oesterreich  Investitionskredit  Aktiengesellschaft),  pp. 7-152, and 
subsequent  updates  to that  study  supplied  by the author.  Under  British  tax laws, much  of 
investment  could  be expensed  ratherthan  depreciated.  For  simplicity,  we assume  complete 
expensing,  in which  case tax parameters  do not appear  in the rental  cost. 142  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
(23)  KtIKt_1 =  K*I(Kt-,)g,  O<g?  1, 
wheref and  g are the adjustment  speeds for labor  and  capital. 
Combining  the desired input and adjustment  hypotheses yields the 
short-term  or disequilibrium  demand  functions: 
(24)  MHt =  {[o/(1 -  a)] -a A - I [(W*IQ*)p]  -a XNR* e-  Pt}f  MHI  , 
(25)  K, =  {[a/o(1  -  a)]  -o A - l [(W*IQ*)t]  lt  XNR * e -  Pt'} Ktll. 
Because man-hours  and capital adjust with lags to changes in the 
desired  quantities,  the observed  inputs  may be over- or underutilized  in 
current  production,  and hence the short-run  production  function  in the 
model allows for variations  in the intensity of use of measured  capital 
and labor  inputs. The rates of factor utilization  are determined  endoge- 
nously by the factor adjustment  processes.24  The procyclical  behavior 
of measured  labor  productivity  is also explained  by the  lagged  adjustment 
of man-hours  to changes  in output. 
Joint estimation  of the short-run  demand  functions  yields estimated 
values of the adjustment  speedsf and  g and  of the structural  parameters 
of the production  function and long-run  factor demand  functions. Ex- 
pectations  of wages, prices, and  output  are  determined  autoregressively, 
except for the expected wage in the U.S. model, which is determined 
from the wage equation, assuming  that agents know the Phillips  curve 
and estimate W on the basis of the unemployment  gap observed in the 
previous period. Significant  breaks  in the rate of technical  progress, or 
growth  rate  of total  factor  productivity,  are  found  in the estimates  for all 
countries  after  the first  oil shock and  account  for much  of the slowdown 
of labor  productivity  and  potential  output,  as will be seen below. 
Determination  of Potential Output 
A short-run  disequilibrium  is determined  each period  in the simulta- 
neous solution  of the labor  market  equations. Firms  are not in long-run 
equilibrium  because adjustment costs  keep them off their planning 
production  function. Neither is there continuous  market  clearing,  since 
24. Hickman  and  Coen,  An  Annual  Growth  Model;  Coen  and  Hickman,  "The  Natural 
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excess unemployment  may exist at the prevailing real wage, either 
because of  deficient aggregate demand or a gap between the full- 
employment  and market wage. As explained earlier, to measure the 
extent of classical and Keynesian  unemployment,  it is first  necessary to 
determine potential output and the full-employment  real wage. Our 
empirical  estimates  of these variables  are  conceptually  the same  as those 
derived earlier for a simplified  static model, but they also allow for 
population  growth  and  the  endogeneity  of labor  supply,  for  the distinction 
between employment  and  man-hours,  for the dynamics  of factor  adjust- 
ments, and  for technical  progress. 
THE  NATURAL  UNEMPLOYMENT  RATE 
The first step is to specify the natural  unemployment  rate in order  to 
estimate  the full-employment  labor  supply.  We follow Michael  Wachter 
in the method of accounting  for the effects of changes in the age-sex 
composition of the labor force on structural  unemployment.25  In the 
United States, the demographic  shift  toward  younger  workers  from  the 
mid-fifties  to the mid-seventies  increased  the importance  of age groups 
with persistently  high unemployment  rates. Moreover, minimum  wage 
legislation may have prevented adjustments  in demand favoring un- 
trained  and  lower-skilled  young  workers,  and  unemployment  insurance 
reduced the cost of unemployment so that structural  and frictional 
unemployment  may have risen among secondary workers, further  in- 
creasing  their  already  high  unemployment  rates. Thus some increase  in 
the aggregate  unemployment  rate  consistent  with  a given degree  of labor 
market  tightness  and  nominal  wage pressures  is to be expected. 
The basic assumption  in estimating  the natural  rate is that prime-age 
male workers were largely unaffected  by these labor market  develop- 
ments, so that their unemployment  rate in a benchmark  year can be 
interpreted  as a specific full-employment  unemployment  rate that does 
not change  over time and  therefore  can be used to isolate that  portion  of 
the change in unemployment  rates of the other age-sex groups that is 
structural  rather  than  cyclical. 
25. Michael  L. Wachter,  "The  Changing  Cyclical  Responsiveness  of Wage  Inflation," 
BPEA, 1:1976, pp. 115-59. 144  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
The natural  unemployment  rate  for the United States is calculated  as 
a weighted  average  of the natural  rates  for the sixteen age-sex groups: 
16 
(26)  UFt--  UFI  t (LF,  tILF,)  , 
where UFi is the full-employment  unemployment  rate and LFi the full- 
employment  labor  force in the ith age-sex group. 
The UFi,  are based on the following  regression: 
(27)  Uit =  exp[c, +  c210gUpt  +  c310g(NNIi,INNIt)], 
where Ui is the actual unemployment  rate in the ith group, U, is the 
unemployment  rate in the prime-age  male group  (forty-five  to fifty-four 
in the United States) and  the other  variables  are as defined  earlier.  Thus 
cyclical  variations  in  the age-sex specific  unemployment  rates  are  related 
to cyclical variations  in Up,  whereas structural  shifts in the Ui  over time 
are related  to the share  of the ith group  in the total population.  The full- 
employment unemployment  rate for prime-age males, UFp,, is held 
constant  at its 1956  level (3.0 percent  in the United  States), and  the other 
UFi, are estimated  by setting U,, =  3.0 in equation 27 and calculating 
the value of the right-hand  side. 
Natural unemployment  rates for the other countries are similarly 
constructed.  The prime-age  male group  in each country  is identified  as 
the group  with both a low mean  unemployment  rate and small  variance 
relative to the mean-forty-  to forty-nine-year-olds  in Austria, forty- 
five- to fifty-four-year-olds  in Germany,  and thirty-five-  to forty-four- 
year-olds  in the United Kingdom.  The natural  rate for the prime  group 
is assumed to be constant at the 1965-69 average value of the group's 
actual unemployment  rate-1.3  percent for the Austrian  group, 0.9 for 
the German  group,  and 1.5 for the U.K. group. 
It is important  to emphasize  that UF is not a nonaccelerating  inflation 
rate  of unemployment  (NAIRU), since it is not calculated  from  a Phillips 
curve by imposing  the nonacceleration  constraint.  It does take account 
of changes over time in factors affecting  structural  and frictional  unem- 
ployment  and the related  changes in labor  market  tightness, but it does 
not impose the assumption  of a vertical  long-run  Phillips  curve. 
The natural  unemployment  rate equations,  together  with the partici- 
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market  aggregates,  compose a labor supply system that  jointly deter- 
mines full-employment  values of the labor force, employment, unem- 
ployment,  and  average  hours,  conditional  on the real  after-tax  consump- 
tion wage and demographic  variables.  The product  of employment  and 
average  hours  gives the full-employment  supply  of man-hours,  denoted 
MHF. 
THE  NATURAL  GROWTH  PATH 
We define  potential  gross national  product  as that output  that would 
be realized  each year if the markets  for labor and capital  were continu- 
ously cleared  at the natural  rate  of unemployment-that is, as the output 
along  an equilibrium  growth  path.26  A key characteristic  of this concept 
is that potential output is unaffected by deviations of actual output, 
factor inputs, and real factor prices from  their  full-employment  values. 
Departures  from the natural  path imply disequilibrium  in the factor 
markets, as the quantities  of capital and labor deviate from their full- 
employment  levels, but these temporary  deviations  do not affect poten- 
tial output in subsequent periods, since they can be offset by future 
changes  in investment  and employment. 
Along the natural  growth path of potential output, both labor and 
capital  are  fully  employed.  Making  use first  of the  labor  market  condition, 
we define  potential  output  as the level of output  that  would  equate  labor 
supply and demand at the natural rate of unemployment and full- 
employment  wage rate. Since the labor demand  function, equation  24, 
relates man-hours  to output and relative factor prices, an expression 
may  be derived  for  potential  output,  conditional  on the wage-rental  ratio, 
by substituting  MHF for MH and solving  the equation  for output: 
(28)  XNRPt  = A[a/(1  -  a)]ct [(W*IQ*)t]o  ePt  MHFJj/f  MHFt-(l -Pf" 
where XNRP is potential  output. Since full employment  would prevail 
each period  along  the natural  growth  path, note that  XNRP depends on 
MHF in the current  and  preceding  year, and  hence on all previous  years 
since the path was established, irrespective of whether the economy 
actually  operated  at full employment  in the preceding  year. 
26. Coen  and  Hickman,  "The  Natural  Growth  Path." 146  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
It remains  to determine  W*IQ*  = (W*IPI*)[(d  + r)I] - I To do so, we 
assume that the real product  wage grows at the same rate as potential 
labor  productivity  along  the natural  path:27 
(29)  (WIP)tI(WIP)t_1  = (XNRPIMHF)tI(XNRPIMHF)t-l. 
The real wage in the labor  demand  function  is in terms  of capital  goods 
prices  and  that  in the labor  supply  equations  in terms  of consumer  prices, 
but the differential  trend  of consumer  and capital  goods prices is small 
enough  that  we ignore  it for present  purposes, setting  (WIP)  = (WIPI)  in 
equation 29 and correcting (WIPC)  for taxes to derive (WATIPC)  in 
equations  17  and 18. 
Finally,  with real  wage expectations  assumed  to be realized  along  the 
natural  growth  path, 
(30)  (W*IQ*)t  (WIPI)t  [(d + r)T]  1, 
where the last term is an autonomous  component of (W*IQ*),  since d 
and r are exogenous and only changes in T that are unanticipated  and 
permanent  are  assumed  to affect  the equilibrium  capital-labor  ratio.  (The 
value of r is constant  at 6 percent  and may be viewed as a required  rate 
of return  on fixed  investment.  )28 Hence the equilibrium  wage-rental  ratio 
increases at the same rate as labor  productivity  and the real wage along 
the natural  path. 
27. This assumption  is not only observationally  realistic  but also consistent  with the 
overall  structure  of the model.  Nominal  wages and  prices  are  endogenous  in the complete 
model,  but  prices  are  related  to unit  labor  costs with  a constant  long-term  markup,  implying 
constant  factor  shares  in long-run  equilibrium  and  equality  of the growth  rates  of the real 
wage and  labor  productivity. 
28. In our  earlier  research  on the U. S. economy  [Coen  and  Hickman,  "Testing  Factor 
Demands  for Monetary  Influences  and Technical Change  in the Postwar Economy," 
Research  Memorandum  241  (Center  for  Research  in Economic  Growth,  Stanford  Univer- 
sity, May 1980)],  we tested many alternative  measures  of r involving  financial  market 
variables:  the after-tax  long-term  interest  rate  in nominal  units and  adjusted  for expected 
inflation;  the corresponding  nominal and real after-tax short-term  interest rates; and 
weighted  averages  of after-tax  bond yields and two different  measures  of the return  on 
equities,  again  with  and  without  adjustment  for  expected  inflation.  None  of these  constructs 
performed  as well in the estimation  of the factor  demand  equations  as the alternative  of an 
assumed  constant  rate  of discount  of 7 percent  (subsequently  reduced  to 6 percent  on the 
basis of direct  evidence  on real  returns  to equity). 
Our  new estimates  for Austria,  Germany,  and  the United  Kingdom  also incorporate  a 
constant  discount  rate  of 6 percent.  This assumption  was again  tested against  the market 
alternatives  of the nominal  and real after-tax  bond yields and found to lead to superior 
estimates  of the demands  for capital  and  labor. Robert M. Coen and Bert G. Hickman  147 
All the ingredients  are  now in place to determine  the full-employment 
path. Rewriting  equation  28 in productivity  form  as 
(31)  (XNRPIMHF)t  B [(W*IQ*)t]o  e'  (MHFtIMHF, 1)(' -  1lf, 
where  B  =  A[(1  -  o)/oI]-a,  and using  equations  17-18,  26-27,  and 
29-31, and related  identities, one can solve simultaneously  for the full- 
employment  values of labor  productivity,  output, labor  force, employ- 
ment, unemployment,  hours  of work, and  the real  wage and  wage-rental 
ratio  along the natural  growth  path, for exogenous values of the demo- 
graphic and policy variables (population, armed forces, government 
employment,  and tax parameters).  The resulting  estimates of the full- 
employment  wage rate, labor  force, employment,  and hours  are used in 
the subsequent  analysis  of Keynesian  and  classical unemployment. 
Capital as well as labor must be fully employed along the natural 
growth  path. In the standard  neoclassical model, a constant  fraction  of 
output  is saved and automatically  invested;  the growth  path  depends  on 
the saving  rate,  and  the real  wage and  return  on capital  adjust  to maintain 
full employment  of both factors. In contrast, our annual  growth  model 
includes an explicit investment demand  function, equation 25, which 
determines  actual  business fixed investment,  and saving  need not equal 
investment ex ante. Our full-employment  equilibrium  growth path is 
based not on a given saving rate, but on a given required  rate of return 
on capital.29  Equation  25 may therefore  be used to determine  the path  of 
potential  capital,  by setting  current  and  lagged  capital  stock and current 
output equal to their full-employment  values KFt, KFf_ 1, and XNRPt. 
With  the revised equation  25 and the identity  relating  gross investment 
and  capital  stock, 
(32)  IFt  KFt  -  (1 -d)KFt  1 
added  to the earlier  equation  system, the net and  gross fixed investment 
required  to sustain the natural  growth path are fully determinate.  A 
greater  flow of saving could not be profitably  absorbed  in fixed capital 
formation  under the given investment conditions, and a smaller flow 
would  be inadequate  to attain  the required  rate of capital deepening  to 
equilibrate  the capital-labor  and  wage-rental  ratios. 
29.  See note 28. 148  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
Decomposing  Classical and Keynesian Unemployment 
Our  initial exposition of the impact of high real wages and deficient 
effective  demand  on unemployment  utilized  an  isoquant  diagram  to focus 
on firms'  labor  and capital  input  decisions. To allow for an endogenous 
labor supply  and employment  dynamics  in the decomposition  of unem- 
ployment, it is more convenient  to work with labor supply  and demand 
functions, comparing the actual schedules to their full-employment 
counterparts.  For simplicity, induced variations  in average hours are 
neglected in the theoretical exposition, although they are taken into 
account in the empirical  estimates. Similarly,  we abstract  from expec- 
tational  errors  in the theoretical  exposition  by assuming  perfect  foresight 
on the real wage.30  Finally, some complications associated with the 
carryover effects of lagged disequilibrium  in the labor market are 
postponed  for later  discussion. 
LABOR  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND 
The conceptual  framework  is illustrated  in figure  2, in which the real 
wage rate is  measured vertically and the quantity of  employment 
horizontally.  The short-run  labor  demand  function  is labeled  LD, and  its 
position depends on the quantity of current output and on lagged 
employment  and  other  variables  as discussed above. At the current  real 
wage and output levels, E persons are employed. The labor supply 
function, L, is shown as inelastic to the real wage, in view of the small 
magnitudes  of the  estimated  elasticities  in  the  various  countries  discussed 
below. Its position depends on the level and age-sex distribution  of the 
population,  and also on the level of E, owing to the discouraged-worker 
effect on labor  force participation.  The number  of unemployed  workers 
is given by UN  =  (L -  E). 
The full-employment  labor  force is LF, and EF is the corresponding 
"full-employment"  volume of employment, equal to (LF  -  UNF), 
where UNF is the number  of persons who would be unemployed  at the 
30. The empirical  measures  are based on the expected real wage. It was shown in 
Hickman, "Real Wages, Aggregate  Demand, and Unemployment,"  that expectational 
errors  are  normally  unimportant  determinants  of the magnitude  of classical  unemployment 
in the United  States, and  the same  finding  applies  for the other  countries  in our sample. Robert M.  Coen and Bert G. Hickman  149 
Figure 2.  Labor Demand and Supply, Actual and Full-Employment 
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natural  rate  of unemployment  UF. The  labor  demand  function  at  potential 
output  is LDP, and WRF  is the real  wage rate  that  would clear the labor 
market,  except for natural  unemployment,  if output  were at its potential 
level.  As  discussed above, all these full-employment  functions and 
magnitudes  are simultaneously  determined  in the solution  for  the natural 
growth  path. 
Suppose  now that  the real  wage  were reduced  to WRF  while  aggregate 
demand  and  output  remained  unchanged.  The  level of employment  under 
this hypothetical  experiment  would be EA. Thus of the total shortfall  of 
employment (EF  -  E), an amount (EA -  E) is attributable to the wage 
gap (WR  -  WRF). The  remainder (EF  -  EA)  stems  from deficient 
effective demand  for output. The employment  shortfall  may therefore 
be decomposed  into its wage and demand  components: 
(33)  EF  -  E =  (EA -  E) +  (EF-  EA). 
At the prevailing  wage, excess unemployment  exists amounting  to 
UN -  UNF. The excess may be decomposed  in two ways. First, since 
(34)  UN  -  UNF  =  (L -  E) -  (LF -  EF)  =  (EF -  E) -  (LF -  L), 
the excess is smaller  than the employment  shortfall  by the amount of 
"hidden"  unemployment  (LF -  L). The hidden  unemployment  is due 
to the induced withdrawal  of potential workers from the labor force 150  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
because of a perceived  lack of job opportunities  at the current  employ- 
ment  level. 
Second, the excess unemployment  may also be factored  into a wage 
component  equal to (UN -  UNA) and a demand  component  given by 
(UNA -  UNF), corresponding  to the associated  employment  shortfalls: 
(35)  UN  -  UNF  =  (UN  -  UNA)  +  (UNA  -  UNF). 
The wage component  of equation  35 is equal  to 
(36)  UN-  UNA  =  (L -  E) -  (LA -  EA) =  (EA -  E) -  (LA -  L). 
Under  the hypothetical  wage reduction,  the increase of employment  to 
EA would induce an increase of the labor  force to LA. Thus unemploy- 
ment would fall less  than employment rose, owing to the induced 
reduction  of hidden  unemployment.3' 
The demand  component  of equation  35 equals 
(37)  UNA  -  UNF=  (LA -  EA) -  (LF-  EF) 
=  (EF-  EA) -  (LF-  LA). 
Thus the demand  component  of total excess unemployment  consists 
of the residual  employment  shortfall  less the residual  volume of hidden 
unemployment.  The smaller  employment  shortfall  at the reduced real 
wage would be partly  offset by the induced  reduction  of hidden  unem- 
ployment. 
This demand  component  could exist even if the real  wage were at the 
full-employment  level. Since it reflects  deficient  demand  in the product 
market, it represents the Keynesian component of excess unemploy- 
ment. Correspondingly,  the wage component measures the extent of 
classical unemployment  due to an excessive real  wage rate. 
31. This statement  neglects  the dependence  of labor  supply  on the real  wage  as well as 
on employment.  To the extent that changes  in the real wage affect the size of the labor 
force, the expression LA  -  L does not correspond to the usual notion of hidden 
unemployment;  rather, it measures the increase in labor force induced by the rise in 
employment  plus the increase  or decrease  directly  induced  by the decline  in the real  wage. 
For the countries  in our study  except Austria,  the estimated  elasticities,  reported  below, 
of labor  force  with  respect  to real  wages  are  negative  (income  effects  dominate  substitution 
effects), so that  for these countries  LA -  L will exceed hidden  unemployment,  while  for 
Austria  it will be smaller  than  hidden  unemployment.  This qualification  is not important 
quantitatively,  however,  because  the elasticities  are  all rather  small  in absolute  value. Robert M.  Coen and Bert G. Hickman  151 
Figure 3.  Carryover Component of Employment Shortfall 
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EMPLOYMENT  DYNAMICS  AND  CARRYOVER  UNEMPLOYMENT 
It might  be thought  that the demand  component  of the employment 
shortfall  (EF -  EA)  would  necessarily  be zero when actual  and  potential 
output  were equal.  This is not generally  true, however, since equality  of 
actual and potential output does not imply that the actual demand 
function for labor LD coincides with the full-employment  demand 
schedule  LDP. Both schedules depend  on lagged  employment,  but this 
is measured by EF( -  1) instead of E( -  1) in the case of LDP,  since the 
natural  growth  path  is defined  for a condition  of continuous  full employ- 
ment. Thus LD would coincide with LDP only if actual and potential 
output  were  equal  and  labor  were  fully  employed  in  the  preceding  period. 
Figure 3 illustrates  the situation  when a shortfall  of actual output in 
this period  follows upon excess unemployment  in the preceding  period, 
as would occur, for example, if output  and employment  fell below their 
potential  levels in period (t -  1) and output  recovered  only partially  in 
period (t). 
The actual and full-employment  demand  and supply schedules and 
the associated  quantities  are the same  as before. The new schedule  LDB 
is hypothetical  and  shows the demand  for labor  that  would  exist if actual 
output  were at the potential  level, given the actual employment  of the 152  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
preceding period. The distance (EF  -  EB) measures the carryover 
component  of the total employment  shortfall  (EF -  E). It is the residual 
shortfall  that  would persist even if actual  output  and  the real wage were 
both at their  potential  levels in period (t), owing to the drag  exerted by 
the employment shortfall (EF -  E) in (t -  1). 
If carryover  unemployment  is recognized  as a separate  category, the 
employment  shortfall  may be decomposed  into three elements: 
(38)  EF-E  =  (EA-E)  +  (EB-EA)  +  (EF-EB). 
In this formulation,  (EB -  EA) measures  the employment  shortfall  due 
to a current  potential  output  gap,  just as (EA -  E) measures  that due to 
a current  wage gap. 
In the illustrative example, the potential output gap is  negative 
(Y <  YP)  and the wage gap positive (WR  > WRF),  but the gaps may go 
either way in principle, and the potential output gaps are frequently 
positive in the empirical  estimates. The corresponding  breakdown  of 
excess unemployment  is given by 
(39)  UN  -  UNF  =  (UN  -  UNA)  +  (UNA  -  UNB) 
+  (UNB  -  UNF), 
where UNB  =  LB -  EB, and the other terms were defined earlier. 
These threefold  decompositions  are interesting  and meaningful,  and 
empirical  estimates  based on equations  38 and  39 were presented  for the 
United States by Hickman.32  The twofold breakdowns  given by equa- 
tions 33 and 35 are preferred,  however, on the ground  that the contri- 
bution of deficient  aggregate  demand  to excess unemployment  should 
be measured by the gap between actual output and full-employment 
output, defined as that output that would be required  to achieve full 
employment  of labor  if the real  wage were at the full-employment  level, 
rather than by the gap between actual and potential output. On this 
interpretation,  the volume of Keynesian unemployment  includes the 
carryover  component  and is measured  by (UNA -  UNF) rather  than 
(UNA  -  UNB). 
A precise measure  of the level of full-employment  output  (XNRF) is 
given by 
(40)  XNRFt  = A[ot/(l  -  ot)]0  ePt  [(WFIQFt]o MHFtIf  MHt_7S  -'f 
32. Hickman,  "Real  Wages,  Aggregate  Demand,  and  Unemployment." Robert M. Coen and Bert G. Hickman  153 
which differs from the expression for potential output in equation 28 
only  by having  lagged  man-hours  substituted  for lagged  full-employment 
man-hours  in the last term. Thus  XNRF is that output  level that would 
induce firms to  hire the full-employment labor supply at the full- 
employment wage rate, given the level of actual man-hours  in the 
preceding  period.  It may  exceed or  fall  short  of potential  output  according 
to whether  actual  man-hours  were lower or higher  than  full-employment 
man-hours  in the preceding  period.33 
Note that  XNRF is closer to most concepts of potential  output  than 
is XNRP, since the former  takes as an initial  condition  each period the 
actual state of the labor (and capital)  market  in the previous.  period. If 
XNRF were used to define potential output instead of XNRP,  no 
carryover term would be identifiable  as an element of the demand 
component EF  -  EA. 
Measuring the Wage and Employment Gaps 
Real wages play a critical  role in our  analysis  of the influence  of wage 
gaps on unemployment  and productivity growth. The real after-tax 
consumption  wage affects  labor  force participation  and  average  working 
hours, whereas  the real wage in terms  of capital  goods prices is the key 
variable  determining  the capital-labor  ratio. The solution  for the natural 
growth path of potential output constrains  both real wage rates to in- 
crease at the same geometric  rate as potential man-hour  productivity, 
before  the potential  consumption  wage is corrected  for taxes. 
An exogenous price shock to the potential  investment  wage cannot 
be directly  captured  in this framework,  however. In the case of the first 
oil shock, for example, the unanticipated  explosion of import prices 
(PM)  raised  the  prices  of investment  goods (P1)  sharply  relative  to money 
wages (W)  in the United States, leading  to an abrupt  drop  in the ratio  of 
the real  wage (WPI)  to labor  productivity  (PROD)  that  persisted  into the 
early eighties, as  shown in figure 4.  For given values of the other 
33. A similar distinction  between full-employment  output and potential output is 
discussed  in Hickman  and Coen, "An Annual  Growth  Model," pp. 17-19, but without 
relating  their  definitions  to the concept  of the natural  growth  path.  The  latter  concept  dates 
from  Coen  and  Hickman,  "The Natural  Growth  Path." 154  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
Figure 4.  Ratio of Real Wages to Productivity, United States, United Kingdom, Germany, 
and Austria, 1966-84a 
Ratio  of real wages  to productivity 
0.76 
United States 
0.74  - 
0.72- 
0.70  - 
0.68 
0.66 r 
1968  1970  1972  1974  1976  1978  1980  1982  1984 





0.68  - 
0.66 
0.64  .  .  . 
1968  1970  1972  1974  1976  1978  1980  1982  1984 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on data from the following  sources:  for the United  States,  U.S.  Department 
of Labor,  Bureau of Labor Statistics;  for Austria,  Austrian  Institute for Economic  Research;  for Germany and the 
United  Kingdom, Organization for Economic  Cooperation and Development,  Labor Force  Statistics,  various issues, 
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components  of rental  price, the exogenous reduction  of the real wage 
decreased  the wage-rental  ratio  (equation  30). An exogenous downshift 
of 7 percent  in the real  wage was accordingly  imposed  in the solution  for 
the natural  growth path during 1974-75, resulting  in a corresponding 
once-for-all  reduction  in the desired  capital-labor  ratio  and  the time  path 
of potential output. Thus part of the deceleration of potential output 
growth during the subsequent five years or so reflects the gradual 
transition  to a lower growth path. Without this relative price shock 
adjustment,  potential  productivity  would  not respond  to the import  price 
shock, and the wage gap  would be understated.34 
Another, equivalent, way of understanding  why the potential path 
must be adjusted  for the relative  price shock is to examine  its effect on 
the rate  of return  on capital.  As shown earlier,  in footnote 17, the rate  of 
return  can  be expressed  as R = oa(PIPI)( YIXK)  -  d. In the United States, 
the energy  shock induced  a lasting  increase  in the price  of capital  goods, 
Pl, relative  to the price  of final  output,  P, of about  7 percent.  To maintain 
the pre-shock  required  rate  of return  of r, the marginal  product  of capital, 
cx(Y/K),  must therefore  rise, and this requires  a decrease in the capital- 
labor  ratio  and  a corresponding  once-for-all  drop  of the potential  output 
path  for the given potential  labor  path.35 
The same sort of behavior is observable in figure  4 for the United 
Kingdom,  except that the import  price explosion began in 1973  instead 
of 1974.  Just  as in the United States, the real  wage path  drops  discontin- 
uously as a result of the supply shock, and the wage-rental  ratio is 
adjusted  downward  in the potential  solution. 
34. The effect of this price-induced  increase  in the relative  cost of capital  services on 
actual  productivity  is captured  automatically  through  the observed  wage-rental  argument 
in the estimated  factor demand  system. For further  discussion of the impact  of energy 
shocks as measured  in the model, see Robert  M. Coen and Bert G. Hickman,  "Energy 
Shocks  and  Macroeconomic  Activity:  Simulation  Results  from  the  Hickman-Coen  Model" 
(Energy  Modeling  Forum,  Stanford  University,  November  1983).  Other  exogenous  shocks 
may  also affect  the  factor  price  ratio  and  potential  and  actual  output.  Thus  the depreciation 
incentives  in the 1981  tax legislation  are estimated  to have reduced  the rental-wage  ratio 
sufficiently  to increase  the level of potential  output,  but not the long-run  growth  rate, by 
about 1 percent  in the 1980s.  See Robert  M. Coen and Bert G. Hickman,  "Tax Policy, 
Federal  Deficits,  and  U.S. Growth  in the 1980s,"  National Tax  Journal,  vol. 3 (March  19, 
1984),  pp. 89-104. 
35. A relative  price  shock  cannot  affect  total  factor  productivity,  which  has nothing  to 
do with  factor  substitution,  but it may alter  the accompanying  level of labor  productivity 
by inducing  a movement  along  the production  function  to a different  capital-labor  ratio- 
in this case, to one with less capital  and output  per worker  and a lower potential  output 
path. Robert M.  Coen and Bert G. Hickman  157 
The  reaction  of the real  wage  to the oil shock  was different  in Germany 
and  Austria.  The  increase  in import  prices  was considerably  smaller  than 
it was in the United States and United Kingdom, and nominal  wages 
increased  more  than  investment  goods prices. As a result, the real  wage 
rose relative to productivity  in both countries in the aftermath  of the 
shock and  did not recede much  until  several years had  passed, as shown 
in figure  4. There is no direct evidence here of an unexpected shock to 
the potential path such as occurred in the United States and United 
Kingdom,  and no adjustment  is made to the potential  wage-rental  ratio 
as determined  by the productivity  trend. This means that the wage gap 
may  be overstated  in these countries  to the extent that  agents may have 
viewed part of the rise in the real wage as permanently  affecting the 
growth  path. 
The second oil shock was much smaller  in relative terms as indexed 
by the import  price  increases  during  1979-80.  The United Kingdom  was 
by then an oil exporter  and the other countries  were less dependent  on 
imported  oil than  before. 
Finally, the dollar appreciated one-third between 1981 and 1984, 
driving  down the real price of U.S. imports  and investment goods by 
one-fifth and one-tenth, respectively, with the result that the real 
investment  wage far outpaced the growth  of productivity  (figure  4). A 
corresponding  adjustment  was phased  into the potential  real  investment 
wage and wage-rental  ratio during  those years in allowance  for the real 
price shock. 
Estimates are required of  the full-employment and hypothetical 
magnitudes  in figure 2. The full-employment  estimates have already 
been described. The hypothetical values of employment, unemploy- 
ment, and labor  force were obtained  by simulation  methods, using the 
labor  market  blocs of the models. To calculate  EA and  LA, the demand 
and supply functions for labor were solved simultaneously,  using the 
actual values for output and other shift variables  external  to the labor 
market,  and the potential or full-employment  values of the real wage 
rates entering labor demand and supply. The various shortfalls  were 
then calculated  from these solutions and the actual historical  data on 
employment,  unemployment,  and labor  force.36 
36. In order  to purge  the calculated  shortfalls  of stochastic  errors,  the hypothetical  or 
counterfactual  simulations  were based on a simultaneous  tracking  solution  of the labor 
market  blocs, in which the single-equation  residuals  had been added to the stochastic 
equations  for  the endogenous  variables. M  Ox Ox r,  -  n  "!  M  "  CII  "  nc 
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These are partial equilibrium  results. No allowance is made for a 
feedback  from  the altered  values of labor  market  variables  to aggregate 
demand and output. The procedure is appropriate  for measuring  the 
wage and  demand  components  of unemployment,  but not for investigat- 
ing the consequences of an exogenous reduction  of real wage rates for 
the economy as a whole. 
Output, Unemployment, and Real Wage History 
It is useful  to observe  the history  of actual  and  potential  gross national 
product, unemployment,  and real wages before examining  the unem- 
ployment  decompositions.  Wage gaps are reported  for both the invest- 
ment and consumption  concepts of the real wage, but it is the former 
that  is meant  by an unmodified  reference  to the real  wage gap. 
As shown  in  table 1,  the U.S. economy  seldom  operated  at  its potential 
level during 1961-84, exhibiting  instead varying  periods of under-  and 
overutilization  as measured  by the ratio of actual to potential output. 
The doldrums  of the early sixties were succeeded by the Vietnam  era of 
low unemployment  and high utilization.  The economy did not stray  far 
from potential during 1970-72, but utilization  exceeded potential by 2 
percent in 1973, before declining in 1974-75 to a low of 96 percent 
following  the oil shock. The subsequent  recovery carried  the utilization 
rate  to 103  percent  during  1978-79,  before it again  declined  to a twenty- 
year low of 92 percent  in 1983,  to be followed by a vigorous  but incom- 
plete recovery in 1984. 
During  the 1960s,  unemployment  exceeded the natural  rate  whenever 
actual  output  fell below potential,  and  vice versa. This outcome is not a 
necessary one under  the Hickman-Coen  concept of the natural  growth 
path of potential output, as it would be in constructs that assume 
competitive  markets  for  goods and  services  either  explicitly  or  implicitly. 
Under  competitive  conditions, if actual  unemployment  is at the natural 
rate, actual output must necessarily be at the full-employment  level, 
because competitive firms  choose what output to supply, given wages 
and  prices, at the same time as they choose how much  labor  to employ. 
The  output  resulting  from  a cleared  labor  market  is therefore  by definition 
at the full-employment  level. With price-setting firms and imperfect 
markets, however, labor demand is conditional on output, which is o~~~~~~~~~~~~c  n  (C  en  00  4  ON  r-bbbo 
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demand-determined  in product  markets.  Unemployment  may therefore 
exceed the natural  rate even with output  at its potential  level, if the real 
wage is above the level that  would  prevail  if the labor  market  were to be 
cleared  at potential  GNP, or if carryover  unemployment  exists because 
of a preceding  shortfall. 
Such excess  unemployment actually occurred with the economy 
slightly above potential  in 1977  and in 1980  because the real wage gap 
(WR/WRF)  was positive and large, as shown in the third and fourth 
panels  of the table.37  Of course, effective demand  may also occasionally 
offset the adverse effects of a large  wage gap, as it did in 1978-79,  when 
unemployment  was reduced  to the natural  level by high  effective  demand 
as reflected  in a utilization  rate  of 103  percent. 
The wage gap was small or negative during  the early 1960s, so that 
classical  unemployment  could  not have been an important  problem.  The 
wage gap rose to successively higher  plateaus  during  the Vietnam  War 
years and in the mid-1970s  and early 1980s, however, increasing its 
unemployment  impact. 
Similar  capsule histories of output, unemployment,  and real wage 
gaps are presented  for Germany  and  Austria  in tables 2 and 3. Germany 
grew rather steadily and operated close to potential output and the 
natural  employment  rate during  most of 1966-73, except for the mild 
recession of 1967  and  the subsequent  overheating  that  culminated  in the 
wage explosion of 1970. Growth in Austria was even steadier during 
1966-73, unemployment  was never excessive, and output did not rise 
much above potential  until the final  year. Real wages were moderately 
high  in Germany  during  this period,  paralleling  the contemporary  expe- 
rience in the United States, but in Austria they did not deviate much 
from  the potential  level. 
The unemployment situation deteriorated markedly in  Germany 
following  the energy shock, with the actual  rate rising  from 1.0 percent 
in 1973  to 8.2 percent  in 1984  as the natural  rate scarcely  increased.  The 
real  wage gap increased  sharply  during  1973-75  and trended  downward 
gradually  thereafter,  with the economy operating  below potential  most 
of the time. In contrast,  Austria  kept unemployment  under  control  until 
1980  by offsetting the real wage gaps that emerged  after the oil shock 
with  positive output  gaps. Beginning  in 1981,  however, Austrian  expe- 
37. Carryover  unemployment  also contributed  to the excess, but  it was less important 
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rience followed the German pattern: underutilization  of productive 
potential,  rising  unemployment,  and a declining  wage gap. 
The United Kingdom  experienced moderate  excess unemployment 
during  1967-74,  owing to a substantial  wage gap that nullified  generally 
high levels of potential  utilization  (table  4). The wage gap increased  50 
percent  during  1975-76, drifted  downward  during  the remainder  of the 
decade, and rose again in the eighties. Unemployment  rose from 2-3 
percent  in 1967-75  to about  5  percent  in 1976-79  and  climbed  dramatically 
thereafter. 
Classical and Keynesian Components  of Unemployment 
The  proximate  sources  of excess unemployment  in the U. S. economy 
are  quantified  in table  5, which  reports  the measures  and  decompositions 
that  were defined  in equations  33-37. 
The natural  level of unemployment  rose from  about  3 million  workers 
in 1961  to more  than  6 million  in the last half  of the 1970s.  The estimated 
excess of actual  over natural  unemployment  was positive in the first  half 
and  negative  in the second half  of the 1960s.  Excess unemployment  was 
also negative  during  1972-74  and in 1979,  but it was positive in 1975-78 
and again in 1980-84. The worst years by far were 1982-83, when the 
excess over natural  unemployment  is estimated  at 4.5 million  persons. 
Employment  was below its natural  level (the shortfall  was positive) 
during  all but the Vietnam War years 1966-69. That measure of the 
unemployment  problem,  however, can be seriously  misleading  because 
of hidden  unemployment.  As shown in the second panel, the volume of 
hidden unemployment  is often substantial,  so that elimination  of the 
employment  shortfall  would reduce unemployment  by a considerably 
smaller  amount. 
The employment shortfall is factored into its wage and demand 
components  in the third  panel, and excess unemployment  is similarly 
decomposed in the final panel. The results confirm that the wage 
component  of unemployment,  which was negligible  in the early 1960s, 
rose moderately  during  the Vietnam  years and the early 1970s  and hit 
new heights thereafter.  Between 1965  and 1974  high effective demand 
more than offset the moderate  wage gaps, and excess unemployment C00  en  00  e00I  enO  ,N  C 000  0 
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was negative  in all years save one. After 1974,  however, unemployment 
exceeded the  natural  level in  most  years.  During  this  period  of chronically 
high  unemployment,  the wage or classical component  was the dominant 
factor in 1977  and 1980,  whereas the demand  or Keynesian  component 
was the principal  depressant  during  1975-76  and 1981-84.  Finally, high 
effective demand neutralized the effects of high real wages during 
1978-79, as unemployment  fell to the natural  level for the only period 
between 1974  and 1984. 
The components  of unemployment  in Germany  are  presented  in table 
6. Unemployment  was below the natural  level during  most years in the 
later  sixties and  early seventies, but a chronic  positive gap developed  in 
1974-82.  Hidden  unemployment,  though  sizable,  was a relatively  smaller 
component  of excess unemployment  than it was in the United States, 
because of the low employment  elasticity of labor  force participation  in 
Germany  (0.17  as compared  with 0.37 in the mid-seventies  in the United 
States). Classical  unemployment  increased  markedly  in the mid-seven- 
ties, but the Keynesian  component  was relatively  more important  even 
in these years, and  it accounted  for virtually  all of the poor employment 
performance  of 1981-84. 
Unlike the United States and Germany,  Austria  did not experience 
chronic unemployment  after the OPEC oil shock, because of offset- 
ting classical and Keynesian components (see table 7). When excess 
unemployment  did finally appear in 1981-84, it was associated with 
a demand shortfall  rather  than a wage gap. Hidden unemployment  is 
substantial  in Austria, owing to the largest employment elasticity of 
labor  force participation  in the group  of four countries (0.48), and was 
negative  more  often  than  not, since  the employment  shortfall  was usually 
negative. 
Excess unemployment  in the United Kingdom,  which was moderate 
in 1967-75, rose somewhat in 1976-80 and stayed at markedly  higher 
levels thereafter  (table 8). The unemployment  of the early years was 
classical  but the balance  shifted  toward  the Keynesian  component  after 
the first energy shock, albeit with sizable contributions  in most years 
from  the continuing  wage gap. The bulk  of the rise during  the eighties  is 
attributable  to a demand  shortfall,  however, just as it is in Austria  and 
Germany.  Hidden unemployment  is relatively moderate  in the United 
Kingdom,  where  the  employment  elasticity  of the  labor  force  is estimated 
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Key Determinants  of the Classical Component 
The magnitude  of the wage component  of the employment  shortfall 
depends  on the wage elasticity of labor  demand  as well as on the size of 
the wage gap. Given a Cobb-Douglas  technology and assuming that 
adjustment  costs keep firms off the long-run  production  function, the 
short-run  elasticity  of man-hour  input  with  respect  to the real  wage rate, 
holding constant other components of the wage-rental ratio, is the 
negative of the product of the capital coefficient in the production 
function  (a) and the adjustment  speed of labor  input  (f). For the United 
States, the estimated  values of these parameters  from equation 24 are 
0.25 and 0.65, yielding an estimated wage elasticity for man-hours  of 
- 0. 16.  The  corresponding  figures  are  0.30, 0.65, and - 0. l9forGermany; 
0.32, 0.58, and -0.18  for Austria; and 0.24, 0.91, and -0.22  for the 
United Kingdom. These small elasticities clearly restrict the scope of 
wage gaps as a cause of unemployment  in the various countries, but 
large  wage gaps may still account  for substantial  unemployment,  as we 
have seen. 
An additional  complication  is introduced  by the endogenous  response 
of average working  hours to wage changes. In all four countries, the 
partial  wage  elasticity  of average  hours  is negative,  indicating  dominance 
of the income over the substitution  effect, and ranges  from - 0.04 in the 
United States to - 0.10 in Germany, - 0.17 in Austria,  and - 0.19 in the 
United Kingdom.  Thus the direct result of a real wage reduction  is to 
increase average hours, partly nullifying  the favorable impact of in- 
creased  man-hour  demand  on employment. 
In the model of Germany,  the response of average  hours is confined 
to the direct  impact  of the wage reduction,  so that  the total employment 
elasticity is the difference between the elasticities for man-hours  and 
average  hours, or -  0.09.38  Although  the partial  elasticities  for the other 
countries  are  also negative  and  therefore  operate  to weaken  the employ- 
ment response to a wage change, the total response of average hours 
also includes the effects of induced changes in other employment or 
labor  force variables  and cannot be directly estimated  from the partial 
38. The  consumption  wage  gap  in Germany  was negative  in 1982-84,  so that  reversion 
to the full-employment  consumption  wage reduces average hours and reinforces the 
favorable  impact  of the reduction  in the investment  wage  on employment  (tables  2 and  6). Robert M.  Coen and Bert G. Hickman  171 
elasticities. The total  response of average  hours  is small  in any event for 
the United  States, but  it appears  to be substantial  for  the other  countries. 
Many  empirical  analyses  of the  effects of real  wages  on unemployment 
neglect the role of induced variations  in average hours by measuring 
labor  input  by employment  rather  than  man-hours  in production  or labor 
demand functions or in reduced-form  equations for employment or 
unemployment.  Our results suggest that this is a serious omission in 
view of the offsetting  effects of wage changes  on man-hours  and  average 
hours  of work. 
The contribution  of a wage gap to an employment  shortfall  depends 
only on the elasticity of demand  for labor  input  and the overall respon- 
siveness of average hours, whereas the wage component of excess 
unemployment  is additionally  affected by the induced labor force re- 
sponse to the hypothetical  wage change. The small wage elasticities in 
the labor force participation  equations for Germany and the United 
States ( - 0.04 and - 0.01) severely constrain  the direct  impact  of wage 
reductions  on the labor  force, but in the United Kingdom  and Austria, 
the wage elasticities are large enough (-0.07  and 0.11) to exert a 
moderate effect on the labor force. As noted above, moreover, the 
employment  elasticities are substantial  in all the countries, so that a 
considerable  portion of the employment gain from a wage reduction 
would  be nullified  by an additional  influx  to the labor  force. 
Potential and Full-Employment  Output 
In this section we compare  the empirical  measures of potential and 
full-employment  output,  as calculated  from  equations  28  and  40, in tables 
9-12. Also included  are utilization  indexes measuring  the ratio  of actual 
output to potential and full-employment  output, plus the ratio of full- 
employment  to potential  output.  The utilization  rate  of full-employment 
output  is a direct indicator  of the amount  of output change that would 
eliminate  the Keynesian component  of unemployment  in a given year. 
The  potential  utilization  rate  is the preferred  measure  of overall  resource 
utilization,  since it shows the extent to which an economy adheres  to its 
natural  growth  path embodying  full employment  of labor  and capital  at 
normal  intensities. 
In the United States, the difference between potential and full- a  'ICeN  n  00  N  e  en  1  00  O 
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employment  output  seldom  exceeded 1  percent,  and  the utilization  rates 
were  correspondingly  close until  1983-84.  The  same  was  true  of Germany 
during  the late sixties and early seventies, but the ratio of full-employ- 
ment  to potential  gross domestic  product  exceeded 2 percent  throughout 
1975-84  and  reached  4 percent  in 1976  and 1984.  The two measures  were 
close in most years for Austria  until the doldrums  of 1983-84. The gap 
between potential  and full-employment  output  tends to be small in the 
U.K. model, owing  to the rapid  adjustment  speed estimated  for the labor 
demand  function  (0.9  as compared  with  about  0.6 for  the  other  countries), 
but the margin  between the two nonetheless increased substantially  in 
the eighties as the employment  shortfall  cumulated. 
More on the Wage Gap and Classical Unemployment 
The  pioneering  wage-gap  analysis  of  Sachs  and  Bruno  attached 
considerable  importance  to the  emergence  in  the 1970s  of large  disparities 
between  the real wage  "warranted"  by full-employment  productivity 
and the realized product wage in many industrialized countries: 
In the late 1960s  and early 1970s,  a real wage explosion (particularly  in Europe 
and Japan)  caused a major  shift of income distribution  away from profits  and 
toward labor. Even before the oil shocks, therefore, many OECD countries 
faced a major problem of declining profitability  and slowing growth. In the 
second phase real wages did not decelerate (outside of the United States) to 
make  room  for the raw  material  price  increases,  so the profit  squeeze  intensified. 
In the third  phase low profitability  and rising  unemployment  slowed the rate of 
capital accumulation  and productivity  growth. Real wage increases were re- 
duced, but so too was productivity  growth, with the result that the excess of 
wages over full-employment  productivity  persisted  into the early 1980s.39 
Thus some, but by no means all, unemployment  was induced  from the 
supply side by price shocks and excessive  labor costs: 
We have suggested  that the sharp increases in unemployment  during  1973-75 
and 1979-82 are mostly demand-induced  and resulted  from the application  of 
tight monetary  policies to the supply shocks and high inflation  in 1972-73  and 
1979-80.  The steady  rise in unemployment  during  1975-79  in most  of the OECD, 
39.  Bruno and Sachs,  Economics  of Worldwide Stagflation,  p.  167. See also Jeffrey 
D. Sachs, "Wages, Profits,  and Macroeconomic  Adjustment:  A Comparative  Study," 
BPEA, 2:1979, pp. 269-319. Robert M.  Coen and Bert G. Hickman  177 
Table 13. Comparison  of Real Wage  Gap Estimates,  United  States,  Germany, 
and the United  Kingdom,  Selected  Years, 1965-83 
Estimate  1965a  1970  1973  1976  1979  1981  1982  1983 
United  States 
Bruno-Sachs  1  1.2  -1.3  3.1  0.6  4.0  5.0  5.3  4.9 
Bruno-Sachs  2  0.2  0.1  6.0  2.9  6.8  8.1  8.6  8.4 
Coen-Hickman  1  2.0  7.1  6.2  7.5  11.9  11.2  11.2  11.2 
Coen-Hickman  2  1.2  8.4  6.9  8.3  12.7  10.7  11.2  11.0 
Germany 
Bruno-Sachs  1  1.7  1.9  8.0  14.0  14.6  17.1  13.3  9.6 
Bruno-Sachs  2  2.0  1.5  7.2  13.0  15.3  19.1  15.9  12.9 
Coen-Hickman  1  2.6  2.8  8.0  14.7  9.0  4.1  2.6  1.4 
Coen-Hickman  2  1.0  3.3  6.9  9.8  8.6  4.0  -0.2  -2.4 
United  Kingdom 
Bruno-Sachs  1  -1.5  1.5  3.1  8.1  9.3  14.3  13.9  13.9 
Bruno-Sachs  2  -2.0  2.2  4.6  11.0  16.4  24.1  25.0  26.4 
Coen-Hickman  1  4.9  9.6  9.2  13.3  7.0  10.8  13.6  17.7 
Coen-Hickman  2  2.7  4.4  8.4  11.4  7.4  12.4  8.7  10.6 
Sources: Bruno-Sachs  estimates  of the real value-added  wage gap in manufacturing  are from Michael  Bruno, 
"Aggregate  Supply  and  Demand  Factors  in OECD  Unemployment:  An Update,"  Economica,  vol. 53 (Supplement, 
1986),  pp. S35-S52. Variant  1 assumes  that  the wage  gap was zero on average  during  1965-69  and  uses the average 
growth  rate of labor  productivity  during  1960-73  and 1973-85  as the full-employment  trend.  Variant  2 corrects  for 
the effect of the unemployment  level and its changes  on full-employment  productivity  growth  using  a regression  of 
realized  productivity  on a time trend  (with  a trend  break  in 1975)  and the unemployment  variables.  Coen-Hickman 
estimates  of the real wage  gap in terms  of investment  goods (variant  1) and consumption  goods (variant  2) are from 
tables 1, 2, and 4. 
a.  1966  for Germany  and the United  Kingdom  in the Coen-Hickman  estimates. 
however, should  be attributed  to the  fact  that  real  wages  remained  above  market- 
clearing  levels in most economies (but  probably  not in the United States).40 
These capsule  summaries  are  based  on an  impressive  array  of theoretical 
and  empirical  analyses, from  among  which  we can comment  only on two 
or three  issues related  to our own estimates. 
WAGE  GAP  ESTIMATES 
Table 13 compares  our estimates with those of Bruno and Sachs as 
updated  through  1983.41  The following points should be borne in mind 
when examining  the table. 
-The  Bruno-Sachs  estimates are for the real value-added  wage in 
manufacturing;  our estimates, for the economywide  real wage in terms 
of capital  goods prices. 
40.  Bruno and Sachs, Economics  of Worldwide Stagflation,  p. 171. 
41. Michael  Bruno, "Aggregate  Supply  and Demand  Factors in OECD Unemploy- 
ment:  An Update,"  Economica,  vol. 53 (Supplement,  1986),  pp. S35-S52. 178  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
The Bruno-Sachs  measures  are conceptually  based on the assump- 
tion of output market  clearing  with competitive  firms  operating  on the 
notional labor demand function, equation 2,  whereas ours assume 
imperfect  competition  and  the conditional  labor  demand  function,  equa- 
tion 6. 
-Both  approaches  assume  a Cobb-Douglas  technology,  with  the full- 
employment  real wage following the trend  of full-employment  produc- 
tivity. They differ  substantially,  however, in the method  of determining 
the productivity  trend, and Bruno and Sachs offer two variants  of the 
productivity  trend  and  wage  gap  series. The  first  of their  measures  shown 
in the table assumes that the wage gap was zero on average during 
1965-69  and  takes  the  average  growth  rate  of measured  laborproductivity 
during  1960-73  and 1973-85  to represent  the respective  full-employment 
trend. In the second variant-the adjusted  wage gaps-they  attempt  to 
correct  for the effect of the unemployment  level and  its changes  on full- 
employment  productivity  growth  using an ad hoc regression  of realized 
productivity  on time, with a trend  break  in 1975,  and  the unemployment 
variables. In our measures the potential productivity  path is endoge- 
nously determined  by a structural  econometric model of labor supply 
and demand, where the latter incorporates  the parameters  of the pro- 
duction function and the adjustment  process. The wage gap is not 
normalized  to zero in the late sixties because our framework  does not 
assume  that  the existence of approximately  full employment  necessarily 
implies  that  the labor  market  is clearing  at the observed  wage rate. 
According  to both measures, the real wage explosion before the first 
energy shock was pronounced  in Germany.  Bruno  and Sachs's finding 
that  the wage  gap  also increased  substantially  in the United  States  during 
1970-73  is puzzling  and probably  reflects  a sizable  underestimate  of the 
gap  for 1970,  owing  to their  normalizing  assumption  that  the labor  market 
was in equilibrium  during 1965-69 despite the overheating  associated 
with the Vietnam  War. The estimated wage gap in our annual  growth 
model, in contrast, was rather  large  in 1970  and actually  fell during  the 
next three  years  of higher  unemployment.  The U.K. gap  in our  estimates 
was also much  higher  in 1970-73  than  during  the late sixties. 
Bruno and Sachs's finding  of a sharp increase in the wage gap in 
Germany  and  the United Kingdom  between 1973  and 1976  in reaction  to 
the first  oil shock is confirmed  in our measures. For the United States, 
our estimated  gap increases somewhat  during  this period,  whereas  their Robert M.  Coen and Bert G. Hickman  179 
figure  declines substantially.  The increase reflects our downward  ad- 
justment  of the potential  path  of labor  productivity  in response  to the oil 
shock as described  above. 
Both studies show a decline in the German  wage gap during  the early 
1980s.  The decline began much earlier  in our estimates, however, with 
the gap narrowing  gradually  in 1976-79  and rapidly  thereafter.  By 1983 
the gap had virtually  disappeared  in our measure  but was still large in 
the Bruno-Sachs  measures. 
The wage gap for the United States rises during  the early eighties in 
the Bruno-Sachs  estimates. The gap decreases slightly  after 1979  in our 
estimates, but even so it remains  above the Bruno-Sachs  estimates. 
In our estimates the wage gap for the United Kingdom decreases 
during 1976-81 and rises again in 1981-83, whereas the Bruno-Sachs 
measures  rise steadily  after 1976.  By 1983  their  two variants  bracket  our 
estimate. 
WAGE  GAPS  AND  LABOR  DEMAND 
The initial theoretical  derivations  by Bruno and Sachs relating  the 
real wage gap to the employment gap are explicitly based on the 
unconstrained  competitive model, implying  that all unemployment  is 
classical and that eliminating  the wage gap would restore full employ- 
ment.42  However, they do not in fact use the competitive  demand  curve 
for labor to evaluate the employment  effects of real wages, since they 
share our distrust of the restrictive assumptions of the competitive 
model, namely,  that  firms  are  generally  not demand-constrained  and  are 
usually on their production  frontiers and notional supply schedules. 
Instead, they "modify the conventional demand curve for labor by 
assuming  gradual  adjustment  as well as a short-run  role for aggregate 
demand  factors.  " 43  Thus their reduced-form  equations  for labor input 
in manufacturing,  although  conditional  on capital stock, also include 
demand  variables  along  with  the real  wage  rate. Similarly,  their  reduced- 
form  equations  for aggregate  unemployment  include  the adjusted  wage 
gaps estimated for manufacturing  as proxies for the corresponding 
42.  Bruno and Sachs, Economics  of Worldwide Stagflation,  chap. 9; Bruno, "Aggre- 
gate  Supply  and  Demand  Factors." 
43. Bruno,  "Aggregate  Supply  and  Demand  Factors," p. S45. 180  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
aggregative  measures,  along  with real money balances,  the government 
deficit,  and  world  trade  as demand  variables,  but omit capital  stock.44 
It is noteworthy  that  their  unemployment  regressions  attribute  much 
less importance  to the wage gap than is implied by the competitive 
theory. Recall that, under  a Cobb-Douglas  technology, the elasticity of 
employment with respect to the real wage for a competitive, profit- 
maximizing  firm  in the short  run  is the reciprocal  of the capital  elasticity 
in the production  function, or about 3 or 4 for realistic values of the 
capital  elasticity. In interpreting  the results of a pooled unemployment 
regression for eight countries that is representative  of their findings, 
Bruno reports that for each 1 percent rise or fall in the wage gap, the 
unemployment  rate  rises or falls by 0. 15  percent  within  two years.45  This 
short-run  elasticity of about 0.15 resembles our estimates and is far 
below the value of 3 or 4 that one would predict  from the competitive 
model of a firm's labor demand decision under unconstrained  profit 
maximization. 
According  to these recent findings  of Bruno,  there was essentially  no 
wage-related  unemployment  in the United States during 1970-82; de- 
mand  and  wage  factors  were about  equally  prominent  in Germany  during 
the same period, but the role of demand  was rising  toward  the end; and 
the wage gap was the dominant influence in the United Kingdom 
throughout  the period, but with demand  restraint  assuming  increasing 
importance  after 1978.  Our  own estimates give much  less weight to the 
wage  factor  in Germany  and  the United  Kingdom,  but  agree  that  demand 
constraints became relatively more important in the  1980s in both 
countries. On the other hand, the wage gap plays a larger,  though still 
subsidiary,  role in our analysis  of U.S. unemployment. 
Investment Demand and Productivity 
Part  of the Bruno-Sachs  thesis is that the supply-induced  wage gaps 
of the first half of the seventies led to a third  phase of low profitability 
and rising unemployment  that slowed the rate of capital accumulation 
and productivity  growth, thereby  tending  to perpetuate  the wage gaps. 
44. See Bruno, "Aggregate  Supply and Demand Factors." This specification  is a 
modification of the one appearing in Bruno and Sachs, Economics of Worldwide  Stagflation, 
chap. 10. 
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In 1986 Bruno estimated rate-of-profit  and investment equations for 
eight  countries  that  led to the general  conclusion  that  output  contraction 
from  the demand  side was the dominant  factor in the profit  squeeze and 
investment  contraction,  with high  real  wages playing  only a small  direct 
role  in the reduction  of capital  formation.  Bruno's  findings  are  in general 
accord  with  our  own, but  our  interpretation  is rather  different,  especially 
as regards  the relationship  between  investment  and  productivity  growth. 
Our  investment  demand  function, equation  25, depends  on expected 
rather  than realized profitability  and is derived  jointly with the labor 
demand  equation  on the assumption  of cost minimization.  Investment 
therefore  depends  on the wage-rental  ratio, and hence on the real wage 
rate in terms of investment goods, as well as on output and technical 
progress. 
Along the natural  growth path, the level of man-hour  productivity 
(equation  31) is governed  by the rate of technical  progress  (growth  rate 
of total factor productivity);  the equilibrium  capital-labor  ratio, which 
in turn  depends  on the equilibrium  wage-rental  ratio;  and  the growth  rate 
of full-employment  man-hours.  As we have shown elsewhere, the last 
term is an implicit measure of the intensity of use of employed man- 
hours.46  The contributions of  these  three components to  potential 
productivity  growth  before  and after 1973,  as calculated  from  our  factor 
demand  estimates, are shown in the first  four columns  of table 14. 
The rate  of technical  progress  decelerated  after  the early  seventies in 
all the countries  in our sample,  as did  potential  productivity  growth.  The 
rate of growth  of the full-employment  real wage also decreased  in line 
with the slowdown  in productivity  growth  (equation  29), thereby mod- 
erating  the secular  increase  in the wage-rental  ratio, reducing  the rate  of 
capital deepening, and further  slowing productivity  growth. Thus the 
slowdown  in technical  progress  induced  a decline in capital  deepening, 
and  hence  in  the net  investment  requirement  to sustain  the  natural  growth 
path  of output.  The causation  runs  from  reduced  productivity  growth  to 
reduced  investment,  rather  than  the reverse. In the cases of the United 
Kingdom  and United States, real investment  demand  was also reduced 
by the unexpected exogenous drop in the investment wage and wage- 
rental  ratio  resulting  from  the first  oil shock. 
Table 15 compares  the actual and potential shares of investment in 
46. Coen  and  Hickman,  "The Natural  Growth  Path." O  XN  1  o  o 
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Table 15.  Investment Shares of Gross National Product, United States,  1956-84,  and of 
Gross Domestic Product, Germany, Austria, and the United Kingdom, 1966-84 
Percent 
Naturala  Realizedb 
Period  Net  Gr-oss  Net  Gross 
United  States 
1956-68  2.40  9.50  2.42  9.58 
1968-73  2.37  10.01  2.60  10.49 
1973-84  1.99  10.29  2.09  10.96 
Germany 
1966-73  10.29  22.17  11.69  23.78 
1973-84  7.78  20.40  7.07  21.37 
Austria 
1966-72  10.02  25.2  10.80  25.95 
1972-84  7.90  23.78  8.46  24.87 
United  Kingdom 
1966-73  9.89  18.91  11.26  20.50 
1973-84  7.15  17.24  6.58  17.98 
Sources:  Authors'  calculations  with data cited in tables  1-4. 
a.  See  text  description  accompanying  equation 32. 
b.  For  the  United  States,  unpublished  estimates  of  private,  nonresidential  net  capital  in  constant  prices  were 
prepared by the Bureau of Economic  Analysis;  for Germany and the United  Kingdom,  benchmark estimates  of real 
net capital,  including residential  and government  capital,  from OECD,  Flows  and Stocks  of Fixed  Capital (OECD, 
1983); for Austria,  estimate  was  derived from a study of gross  capital stocks  by Franz Hahn and Ingo Schmoranz, 
"Schaetzung  des  oesterreichischen  Kapitalstocks  nach Wirtschaftstbereichen,"  Monatsberichte,  Austrian  Institute 
for Economic  Research,  vol.  56 (1983), pp. 40-52.  Equation 32 in the text was applied recursively  to generate capital 
stock  series  from the benchmarks,  using real gross investment  expenditures  from the national accounts. 
aggregate  output. For the United States and Austria  the realized  shares 
are larger, so that actual capital formation exceeded the investment 
requirements  for potential output during  the seventies and eighties.47 
The same was true  of Germany  and  the United Kingdom  for most of the 
period. The upshot is that in 1984  the actual capital stock equaled the 
potential  requirement  in  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom  and  exceeded 
it by 7.5 percent  in the United States and 3.5 percent  in Austria.  Clearly 
output was not constrained  by insufficient  physical capital in any of 
these countries  during  this period. 
Even were the actual  capital  stock to fall below the potential  require- 
ment,  there  would  be no permanent  loss of potential  productivity,  since 
the investment deficiency could be made good in the future and the 
47. This is true  even when allowance  is made  for the fact that  realized  investment  is 
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growth of total factor productivity  is independent  of realized capital 
formation.48  That is the basic reason for defining  the potential output 
path as the equilibrium  growth path that would be consistent with 
continuous  full employment  of both labor  and capital. 
Finally,  what  is the effect on measured  labor  productivity  and  invest- 
ment if the real wage is above the full-employment  level, as in figure  2? 
For  the  given  output  level positioning  the  labor  demand  function,  realized 
labor  productivity  varies  positively with the real  wage, so that  when the 
wage  gap  is positive, actual  productivity  exceeds potential  productivity. 
By the same token, the desired  capital-labor  ratio, and hence actual  net 
investment,  is higher  than  it would  be without  a wage gap. 
Potential and Realized Productivity 
An equation similar  to equation  31 governs the behavior  of realized 
productivity  as a function  of the rate  of technical  progress,  the expected 
wage-rental  ratio,  and  the rate  of growth  of actual  man-hours,  measuring 
the intensity  of labor  utilization,  plus a stochastic  error  term. As may be 
seen from  table 14,  the growth  rates  of potential  and  realized  productivity 
are much the same, since they are equally affected by the underlying 
rate  of technical  progress;  and the contributions  of the other  terms, and 
especially of the wage-rental  ratio, are highly correlated. Clearly the 
trend  rates of actual  and  potential  productivity  are quite similar  and not 
strongly  affected  by the wage-rental  gap. One expects to observe short- 
run fluctuations  about the trend of potential productivity, however, 
owing  to wage-rental  shocks and  adjustment  lags. 
If the equations for realized and potential prod-uctivity  are divided 
term-by-term,  the result  is an expression  explaining  the ratio  of realized 
and  potential  productivity  as a multiplicative  function  of the ratio  of the 
contributions  of the expected and potential  wage-rental  rates, the ratio 
of actual  and  potential  labor  utilization,  and  the error  term  in the realized 
productivity  equation.  The  term  for  technical  progress  drops  out  because 
it is common to both equations. These measures are shown for each 
country  from 1966  to 1984  in table 16. 
48. This assumes  that learning  by doing  through  capital  formation  is an unimportant 
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The contribution  of the wage-rental  term depends on the size of the 
wage gap, since all other components of the wage-rental  ratio cancel 
out, and  on the elasticity  of labor  productivity  with respect to the wage- 
rental  ratio,  given  by the  estimated  value  of  aO  in  the  production  function- 
about  0.25  forthe United  Kingdom  and  United  States  and  0.30  for  Austria 
and  Germany.  A comparison  of columns 1  and  4 for each country  shows 
a high  correlation  between the wage and  productivity  gaps, as expected. 
However, ffictuations in labor utilization  and stochastic disturbances 
also affect the productivity  gap substantially  in some years. Insofar  as 
the association between the wage and productivity  gaps is concerned, 
the principal  point is that a positive productivity  gap stemming  from a 
positive wage gap is a symptom of labor market  disequilibrium  rather 
than  a lasting  productivity  gain. 
Which Full-Employment  Concept? 
Our analytical framework  distinguishes between the classical and 
Keynesian components of  excess  unemployment. Traditionally  the 
definition  of full employment has allowed for a necessary amount of 
unemployment  for efficient  functioning  of labor  markets  in the presence 
of internal  migration,  resource reallocation,  seasonal fluctuations,  and 
job search activities. It is this concept of frictional  or structural  unem- 
ployment  that  underlies  Wachter's  normalized  unemployment  measure 
of the natural  unemployment  rate  as adapted  for this study.49 
The concept of the unemployment  rate consistent with nonacceler- 
ating inflation  (NAIRU) also posits a necessary quantity  of frictional 
unemployment,  and in the absence of supply shocks the natural  unem- 
ployment  rate  is conceptually  the same under  the two alternatives,  as is 
clear from Milton  Friedman's  original  definition.50  Measurement  of the 
NAIRU from a Phillips curve is unusually sensitive to the precise 
49. Wachter,  "The Changing  Cyclical  Responsiveness  of Wage  Inflation." 
50. "The 'natural  rate of unemployment,'  in other words, is the level that would be 
ground  out by the Walrasian  system of general  equilibrium  equations,  provided  there is 
embedded  in  them  the  actual  structural  characteristics  of the  labor  and  commodity  markets, 
including  market  imperfections,  stochastic  variability  in demands  and supplies,  the cost 
of gathering  information  about  job vacancies  and  labor  availabilities,  the costs of mobility, 
and so on." Milton Friedman,  "The Role of Monetary  Policy," American  Economic 
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specification  of the functional  relationship,  however, as may be seen 
from  the wide range  of empirical  estimates  in the literature. 
NAIRU estimates  by David Coe and Francesco Gagliardi  are shown 
in table 17.51  They offer two series that differ conceptually  only in the 
specification  of the trend  rate of increase of import  prices and that are 
nonetheless strikingly dissimilar when it  comes  to  the estimated 
NAIRUs. The first set uses the actual growth rate of import  prices in 
each subinterval  to estimate  trend  changes  in the terms  of trade,  whereas 
the second uses an average  rate  of growth  calculated  over the estimation 
period (longer than the total span covered in the NAIRUs) of the 
underlying  Phillips curves. Thus the first set responds promptly to 
current  and recent import  price shocks, whereas the second smooths 
them  over the entire  estimation  period. Also reproduced  in the table are 
NAIRU estimates  for several countries  from  other studies  cited by Coe 
and  Gagliardi,  which again  differ  substantially  from  the others.52 
These ambiguities  stem partly from differing  attempts to adjust  for 
shifts  in the Phillips  curve in response  to supply  shocks. When  the issue 
is viewed in terms of these NAIRU concepts, in other  words, attention 
shifts from purely frictional unemployment  to unemployment  that is 
needed to offset the inflationary  consequences of supply shocks. The 
concept  of the natural  rate  has  changed  from  a measure  of unemployment 
necessary for microeconomic  efficiency to one seeking to avoid accel- 
erating inflation  from demand management  policies. In terms of our 
figure  2, the supply  shock that  raised  the actual  real  wage above the full- 
employment  level is also assumed to have shifted the full-employment 
labor  supply  leftward  to a level consistent with stable  inflation,  creating 
long-term  equilibrium  natural  unemployment  as well as disequilibrium 
classical  unemployment. 
The specification  of the natural  unemployment  rate may markedly 
51. David T. Coe and Francesco Gagliardi,  "Nominal Wage Determination  in Ten 
OECD  Economies," Working  Paper 19 (Paris:  Organization  for Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development,  March  1985). 
52. Estimatesforthe  United  States  are  from  A. S. Englanderand  C. A. Los, "Recovery 
without  Accelerating  Inflation,"  Quarterly  Review  (Federal  Reserve Bank  of New York, 
Summer  1983),  pp. 19-28;  and  S. Braun,  "Productivity  and  the  NAIRU  (And  Other  Phillips 
Curve  Issues)," Working  Paper  34 (Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve System, 
February  1984).  EstimatesforothercountriesarefromR.  Layard,G.  Basevi,  0. Blanchard, 
W. Buiter,  and R. Dornbusch,  "Europe:  The Case for Unsustainable  Growth," Center 
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Table 17.  Comparison of Estimates of the Nonaccelerating Inflation Rate 
of Unemployment (NAIRU), Selected Periods,  1961-83 
Percent 
NAIRU estimates 
Coe-Gagliardi  Average  estimatesa  Other  studies" 
unemploy- 
Country  Period  ment rate  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
United  States  1961-69  4.7  ...  ...  4.8  5.9 
1967-69  3.6  4.1  5.7  ...  5.9 
1970-73  5.4  6.0  5.4  6.0  5.8 
1974-81  6.9  7.3  6.5  6.8  7.1 
1982-83  9.7  4.2  6.1  ...  6.8 
Japan  1972-75  1.5  1.2  1.2  ...  ... 
1976-80  2.1  1.9  1.9  ...  ... 
1981-83  2.2  2.3  2.3  ...  ... 
Germany  1967-70  1.0  0.9  0.7  1.3 
1971-75  1.8  1.6  3.3  1.2 
1976-80  3.6  3.1  2.4  3.5 
1981-83  6.3  8.0  3.6  6.2 
France  1966-70  2.1  ...  ...  2.2 
1971-75  2.7  4.6  4.5  3.3 
1976-80  5.2  3.3  4.8  5.2 
1981-83  8.3  9.0  7.7  6.9 
United  Kingdom  1967-70  2.2  2.6  7.1  2.4 
1971-75  3.0  7.2  4.2  4.0 
1976-80  5.4  7.3  7.6  4.7 
1981-83  10.6  5.9  9.4  9.2 
Italy  1966-70  5.5  4.8  7.5  7.8 
1971-75  5.8  7.2  5.4  6.6 
1976-80  7.1  6.0  5.2  6.5 
1981-83  9.1  6.1  5.4  7.5 
Canada  1967-69  4.2  3.8  6.4 
1970-73  5.9  4.1  4.7  ... 
1974-79  7.2  7.2  5.8  ... 
1980-83  8.5  6.9  7.4  ... 
Austria  1969-73  1.4  1.0  1.1  ... 
1974-79  1.8  1.4  1.4 
1980-83  3.0  2.4  2.4  ... 
Netherlands  1969-73  2.5  2.2  3.0 
1974-79  5.2  5.4  4.5  ... 
1980-83  9.3  10.6  8.7  ... 
Source:  Reproduced  from  Coe and Gagliardi,  "Nominal  Wage  Determination  in Ten OECD  Countries." 
a. The NAIRU  estimates  in column  I are calculated  using  the actual  rate  of growth  of import  prices;  in column  2 
they are calculated  using  the average  rate  of growth  over the estimation  period. 
b. For the United  States  the source  is Englander  and  Los, "Recovery  without  Accelerating  Inflation,"  in the first 
column  and Braun,  "Productivity  and  the NAIRU," in the second;  for the other  countries  the source  is Layard  and 
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affect  the estimated  quantity  of excess unemployment  and  its breakdown 
into classical  and  Keynesian  components  in our  model.  The  full-employ- 
ment  wage, and  hence the wage  gap, is invariant  to changes  in the natural 
rate, since the latter  is not a determinant  of technical  progress, capital 
deepening, or labor utilization, and hence does not affect the path of 
potential  productivity.  An increase in the natural  rate does reduce the 
estimated full-employment  labor supply, however, which means that 
the unchanged  wage gap will account for a larger  fraction  of a reduced 
volume  of excess unemployment.  If a NAIRU specification  is used, and 
it closely tracks the actual unemployment  rate, as it usually does in 
empirical  estimates, there  is little or no disequilibrium  unemployment. 
Which concept should provide the basis for estimation of excess 
unemployment?  We advocate the normalized  unemployment  rate un- 
derlying  the  preceding  tables,  especially  in view of the large  uncertainties 
involving  even carefully  prepared  NAIRU estimates. To quote Coe and 
Gagliardi  on the estimates  reproduced  above: 
It must  be noted that  the confidence  intervals  around  these estimates  are likely 
to be very large  reflecting  imprecise  coefficient  estimates  and mis-specification 
in the wage  and  price  equations.  For  this  reason,  as well as the analytic  fuzziness 
of the NAIRU concept when applied  to economies out of long-run  equilibrium, 
the policy relevance  of the estimated  NAIRU's may not be great.53 
By providing  a conservative  estimate  of the rise of the natural  rate  from 
demographic  and internal  forces, our analysis of excess  unemployment 
focuses on the proximate  causes of the rise of actual unemployment  in 
the seventies and  eighties, without  attempting  a problematic  breakdown 
between the natural  and classical components  of wage-gap  unemploy- 
ment from supply shocks. The associated estimates of potential  output 
also provide a superior  capacity benchmark,  since they allow only for 
changes  in the amount  of frictional  unemployment  required  for  economic 
efficiency.54 
A similar  approach  is followed, incidentally,  by Bruno and Sachs.55 
It is true  that  they estimate  a Phillips  curve that allows for the effects of 
changes  in the product  wage gap, the terms  of trade,  and  the growth  rate 
of full-employment  labor productivity  on consumer  price inflation  at a 
53. Coe and  Gagliardi,  "Nominal  Wage  Determination,"  p. 29. 
54. Our estimates of normalized  unemployment  could be improved, however, by 
explicitly  incorporating  variables  directly  affecting  frictional  unemployment. 
55.  Bruno  and  Sachs,  Economics  of Worldwide Stagflation,  chap. 10. 190  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
given unemployment  rate, and that embodies "a long-run  threshold  of 
unemployment  (like a 'natural  rate,' UNv)....  This UN is defined  as the 
level of unemployment  such that real wage growth  is just balanced  by 
trend  productivity  growth  adjusted  for  terms-of-trade  changes.  " 56When 
it comes to the unemployment  consequences  of supply  shocks, however, 
these are estimated in a reduced  form of actual unemployment  on the 
wage gap and on real money balances as a demand  factor. The relative 
importance  of the wage gap and demand  factors is then discussed in 
terms of their contributions  to the increase of actual unemployment 
between 1965-69 and later subperiods, as in the updated findings of 
Bruno cited above.57  Our approach to accounting for the proximate 
sources of the rise of unemployment  is clearly  in the same spirit. 
Policy Implications 
What is  the significance of  our empirical measures for demand 
management  policy? A full answer is beyond the scope of this paper, 
since it requires  a complete  model  of the determination  of wages, prices, 
and other key macroeconomic  variables. However, some conclusions 
may be stated for the case where the real wage is not much altered  by 
demand  management,  a case broadly  consistent  with  normal  cost pricing 
and cyclical history. 
When  excess unemployment  is largely  attributable  to a demand  gap, 
considerable  scope is implied  for demand  management,  even if the wage 
gap is substantial.  The existence of a sizable  wage gap is not prima  facie 
evidence that classical unemployment is a dominant factor or that 
employment  will not respond  to demand  expansion. 
The  gap  between  current  and  full-employment  output  is a quantitative 
estimate of the amount of output expansion needed to eliminate that 
portion  of excess unemployment  attributable  to deficient  demand  at the 
56. Ibid,  p. 202.  The  wage  equation  necessary  to identify  the parameters  of the natural- 
rate  specification  is not  estimated  by Bruno  and  Sachs,  however,  so no empirical  measures 
of the natural  rate  are supplied  in their  study. 
57. Bruno,  "Aggregate  Supply  and  Demand  Factors."  The same  general  point  is also 
valid for the important  multicountry  study of C. R. Bean, P. R. G. Layard, and S. J. 
Nickell, "The Rise of Unemployment:  A Multicountry  Study," Economica, vol. 53 
(Supplement,  1986),  pp. S  1-S22. They offer  a similar  reduced-form  analysis  of the role of 
demand  and supply  factors  in the change  in actual  unemployment  between 1956-66  and 
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full-employment  wage level. The amount  of demand  stimulus  needed to 
close the output  gap will of course depend on the multiplier  properties 
in a given model  or country  and may vary with the policy instrument. 
Although the utilization  rate of full-employment  output is a direct 
indicator  of the output  expansion  required  to attain  full employment  in 
a given year, the preferable  target in a longer perspective is potential 
output,  because capital  as well as labor  will be optimally  employed  along 
the natural  growth  path. 
Neither  concept  involves a NAIRU estimate  of the natural  unemploy- 
ment  rate,  for the reasons  previously  discussed. The existence of a large 
demand  gap implies room for substantial  expansion of employment  at 
the  given  real  wage  and  a correspondingly  large  degree  of excess capacity 
to restrain  price pressures, but it does not provide a direct estimate of 
the inflationary  consequences  of an approach  to full employment. 
Does classical unemployment  pose special problems of macroeco- 
nomic adjustment  that differ from those associated with Keynesian 
unemployment?  To what extent can or should classical unemployment 
be offset by stimulating  aggregate  demand? 
In  a complete  macroeconomic  model  based  on imperfect  competition, 
firms  set prices as a markup  on unit  labor  costs, the markup  varying  with 
demand conditions, so as to achieve given profit margins  or rates of 
return.  Demand  expansion  would  therefore  imply  an attempt  by firms  to 
raise their markups  in the hope of reducing real product wages and 
restoring  or raising  profit margins.  If nominal  wages are incompletely 
indexed to prices, real wages and classical unemployment  may then be 
decreased along with Keynesian unemployment  by expansionary  de- 
mand  policy. 
To the extent that  real  wages are sticky in the face of price increases, 
however, firms' price-setting  behavior will not easily remove a wage 
gap, and  the rising  price  level may  reduce  aggregate  demand  through  the 
Keynes or Pigou effects, offsetting  part of the reduction  in Keynesian 
unemployment  for a given degree  of demand  stimulus. 
The manner  in which imperfectly  competitive  firms  attempt  to main- 
tain profit margins also has implications  for the efficacy of demand 
management  to offset classical unemployment.  While it is possible to 
increase labor demand  at given factor prices by stimulating  aggregate 
demand,  the demand  stimulus  does not directly address  the imbalance 
between firms'  desired rates of return  and their lower realized  rates of 
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output  is at the full-employment  level, the wage gap should  induce  firms 
to raise prices, which may or may not bring down real wages. If real 
wages are sticky and the gap persists, stimulation  of demand, while 
reducing  excess unemployment,  may add to the upward  pressure on 
prices by raising  capacity utilization.  The inflationary  consequences of 
a given wage gap may thus be accentuated  by the demand  stimulus. 
To offset classical unemployment  by augmenting  aggregate  demand, 
while at the same time holding  down inflationary  pressures, may there- 
fore require  that  demand  stimulus  be accompanied  by actions  to sustain 
profits  at acceptable  levels-employment  subsidies, investment subsi- 
dies, general  subsidies  to state enterprises,  and so forth.  While  the long- 
term  effects of such actions  on economic  efficiency  may  be undesirable, 
the approach may nonetheless prove superior to efforts to eliminate 
classical unemployment  by direct  attacks  on wage gaps. 
It is important  to bear  in mind  that  a full-employment  macroeconomic 
equilibrium  is not assured  by having  the real wage at the natural  level. 
Output  must also be at the full-employment  level. In a framework  of 
imperfect  competition  in  which  output  is demand  determined,  an  incomes 
policy aimed  at directly  reducing  the real wage to the natural  level may 
lead to a level of aggregate  demand  that falls short of or exceeds full- 
employment  output, in which case demand  management  must be used 
in conjunction  with the incomes policy to achieve full employment. 
Again, a full model of aggregate  supply  and  demand  is required  to study 
the efficacy  of incomes  policies, and  the appropriate  mix of incomes and 
demand  management  policies may depend on the particular  historical 
and  institutional  circumstances. 
Conclusions 
Our  new measures  identify  demand  gaps  as the major  source  of excess 
unemployment  during  1967-74  in all the countries  in our sample  except 
the United Kingdom. The United States, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom experienced chronic excess  unemployment  after 1974, but 
Austria  escaped their  fate until 1981-84.  In the United States, the wage 
gap has increased in importance  especially since 1974, but aggregate 
demand  has  remained  the dominant  determinant  except in isolated  years. 
The  wage  gap  in  Germany  waxed  and  waned  during  1973-84,  but  classical 
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was minimized  in Austria during  the 1970s by offsetting demand and 
wage gaps. Although  not the dominant  component  in most years since 
1974,  classical  unemployment  has usually  been substantial  in the United 
Kingdom.  The sharp  run-up  of unemployment  in all the countries  during 
the 1980s  was induced primarily  by deficient demand, although  it was 
substantially  augmented  by large  wage gaps in the United Kingdom  and 
the United States. 
Hidden  unemployment  is quantitatively  important  in all  the countries, 
so that  elimination  of the employment  shortfall  would  reduce  unemploy- 
ment  by a considerably  smaller  amount  in most years. This is especially 
true  of Austria  and  the United  States, where  the employment  elasticities 
of labor  force participation  are larger  than  they are in Germany  and the 
United Kingdom. 
Inverse responses of average hours substantially  mitigated  the em- 
ployment improvements from the simulated wage reductions in all 
countries  except the United States, where the induced  rise in hours  was 
small. The implication is  that empirical studies that abstract from 
endogenous changes in hours may seriously overestimate the wage 
elasticity  of employment. 
The finding  of large and growing  demand  gaps in the 1980s  implies 
that expansionary monetary and fiscal policies would act to reduce 
unemployment  in these countries.  As mentioned,  our  partial-equilibrium 
measures provide quantitative  estimates of the output expansion that 
would  eliminate  Keynesian  unemployment  were the real  wage invariant 
to demand  expansion. Since the real wage is an endogenous variable, 
however, the classical component  of unemployment  could increase or 
decrease in the process of demand expansion, and a complete policy 
prescription  is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Irrespective  of equilibrium  NAIRU calculations, import  price pres- 
sures  in  the European  countries  have  been  eased substantially  by reduced 
oil prices and a weak dollar, and our low potential  utilization  estimates 
for Germany  and the United Kingdom  indicate a considerable  margin 
for expansion  without  undue  pressure  on markups.  Finally,  if there  is an 
element  of hysteresis  in the natural  rate,  as in the insider-outsider  theory 
of Blanchard  and Summers, a demand expansion that reduced actual 
unemployment  would also reduce  the NAIRU.58 
58. Olivier  J. Blanchard  and Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Hysteresis  and the European 
Unemployment  Problem,"  Working  Paper  1950  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research, 
June  1986). Comments 
and Discussion 
Stephen M. Goldfeld: The interesting  paper  by Robert  Coen and Bert 
Hickman  is motivated  by one of the important  questions of this or any 
other day-the  sources of unemployment  both here and abroad. The 
paper explores the intuitively appealing notion that both aggregate 
demand  and  real  wages have a role in the explanation.  More  specifically, 
it provides a methodology  for sorting  out the relative  effects of each of 
these variables and carries out this "unemployment  accounting" for 
four countries. In discussing the paper, I first briefly examine some 
features of the underlying  model. I then turn to the question of the 
potential sensitivity of the unemployment  accounting to alternative 
assumptions. Finally, I consider the somewhat harder  issue of what 
questions  the numbers  and methodology  are providing  answers  to. 
Coen  and  Hickman  characterize  their  model  as supplying  a framework 
consistent  with the assumption  of imperfect  competition  in the presence 
of uncertainty.  While  this is generally  a fair  characterization  there  are a 
few elements of inconsistency  that are worth  noting. One  feature  of the 
model is that capital and labor inputs are viewed as chosen so as to 
minimize  the cost of producing  the expected level of output.  Presumably 
more relevant  is the choice of inputs so as to minimize  expected cost, 
but  this is a rather  minor  inelegance.  A bit more  inelegant  is the fact that 
adjustment  costs are posited to lead to separate partial adjustment 
models for capital and labor, although this too is a feature of other 
models. 
The treatment of adjustment  raises some other issues. Given the 
partial  adjustment  of factor inputs in the Coen-Hickman  model, in the 
short run firms end up off their long-run  production  function. Firms 
compensate  for this by endogenously  adjusting  the utilization  of capital 
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and labor. Whether this makes sense in all circumstances obviously 
depends on one's views of the underlying  technology, that is, of the 
scope for ex post substitutability  between capital  and  labor. 
The endogeneity  of capacity utilization  also raises a question about 
the nature  of the underlying  price  equation.  In the Coen-Hickman  model 
prices  are determined  by a markup  over normal  unit  labor  costs but also 
depend on import  prices and capacity utilization.  The presence of the 
latter  variable  suggests  that  price-setting  behavior  should  therefore  take 
account  of the adjustment  costs driving  the partial  adjustment  of inputs. 
This interconnection  between pricing  and factor adjustments  seems to 
be missing  from  the model. On the other hand, since the price equation 
is ignored in the unemployment  accounting, except for the possible 
reverse effect of the pricing  strategy  on the adjustment  of capital, this 
point  is somewhat  moot. 
On the whole, while one may quibble with various features of the 
Coen-Hickman  model, these are hardly  the major  issues in the context 
of the paper. 
A more  serious  set of questions  concerns  the details  of the unemploy- 
ment  accounting  and  the potential  sensitivity  of the numerical  results to 
alternative  assumptions,  either as to the specification  of the estimated 
equations or as to the general structure  of the model. To begin with, 
even taking  the specification  of the model  as given, the stochastic  nature 
of the estimated  equations  means that the unemployment  accounting  is 
subject to uncertainty.  Unfortunately  no measures of this uncertainty 
are provided, so we remain  unsure  as to the precision of the split into 
wage and  demand  gaps. Once we recognize  the possibility  of alternative 
specifications,  the robustness  issue is even more critical.  That  this is of 
some potential  relevance is suggested  by the observation  that some of 
the key elasticities  in the present  model  appear  noticeably  different  from 
those of other  researchers.  Another  example is provided  by the natural 
rate  of unemployment.  In  the  present  paper,  the  natural  rate  is determined 
by purely demographic  considerations  and is driven by the prime-age 
male  unemployment  rate. Needless to say, there  are alternative  ways to 
generate  this benchmark  rate and, as Coen and Hickman  acknowledge, 
the particular  numbers  used will have a direct effect on the accounting 
exercise. 
A rather  different  sort of sensitivity issue is raised by the treatment 
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wage expressed in terms of both consumer and capital goods prices, 
and, as a simplification,  Coen and Hickman  assume that one can ignore 
the differential  trend in consumer and capital goods prices along the 
potential  path. By their own numbers,  admittedly  for the actual rather 
than  potential  path, this assumption  appears  a bit problematic. 
A closely related  issue concerns  the adjustments  made  in response to 
the first oil  shock. The unanticipated  increase in import prices is 
characterized  as raising  the prices  of investment  goods relative  to money 
wages and is dealt with by imposing on the full-employment  path an 
exogenous downshift  in the real wage of 7 percent. As one justification 
for this, Coen and Hickman state that the oil shock induced a lasting 
increase of about 5 percent in the ratio of the price of capital  goods to 
final  output.  It  is clear  that  the  initial  effect was of this  order  of magnitude, 
at least if one uses implicit  deflators  rather  than fixed-weight  indexes. 
Indeed, using the latest GNP data, the relevant  ratio  goes from  0.929 in 
1973  to 0.976 in 1975. However, by 1984, the ratio has fallen to 0.915, 
below its level in 1973.  While  these numbers  are  not definitive  as to what 
would happen  along a potential  path, the assumed  permanent  nature  of 
the changes is open to some doubt. Indeed, the authors allow for a 
second shift  in the 1980s,  arising  this time  from  the dollar's  appreciation. 
A perhaps more satisfactory  way to deal with this issue would be to 
model explicitly the behavior  of investment  good and final  good prices 
in response  to import  price changes. 
A somewhat  different  issue concerning  the unemployment  accounting 
is the treatment  of the so-called carryover  unemployment.  Because of 
the existence of adjustment  lags, even if output  and the real wage are at 
their full-employment  values, the economy will not be in long-run 
equilibrium  unless last period's man-hours  were also at the full-employ- 
ment  level. The part  of unemployment  attributable  to this lagged  adjust- 
ment  is carryover  unemployment.  Although  in some earlier  work Hick- 
man  reported  carryover  unemployment  separately,  in the present  paper 
it is lumped  in with unemployment  due to inadequate  demand. While 
this is to some extent semantics, I would have preferred  the earlier 
treatment  since it strikes  me as a bit  unreasonable  to contemplate  driving 
output above potential output to compensate for past shocks and for 
policy errors. As this suggests, one's preferred  treatment  of carryover 
unemployment  is related  to the more  general  issue of how one interprets 
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Broadly put, the key question is what we learn by an allocation of 
unemployment  into real  wage and  aggregate  demand  components.  Coen 
and Hickman  suggest that such an allocation  indicates the "proximate 
causes" of unemployment. They also indicate that their allocation 
utilizes demand  functions conditional  on real wages and output. Some 
care  is needed in interpreting  this statement  because however Coen and 
Hickman  choose to regard  output  and  the real  wage, the data  they utilize 
emerge  from  a real  world  economy where  output,  the real  wage, and  the 
variables  they analyze explicitly are all jointly endogenous. Potential 
technicalities  aside, it is somewhat  unclear  as to the sense in which the 
Coen-Hickman  calculations  yield proximate  causes. Other  attempts  at 
unemployment  accounting  have considered a wider range of potential 
explanations such as unemployment  benefits, union power, skill or 
regional  mismatches, and public unemployment,  to name a few. How 
these sorts of considerations  should be integrated  with wage gaps and 
demand gaps is not really clear, in part because the unemployment 
accounting  exercise does not seem to give answers to any well-posed 
question. 
What  lies behind economists' interest in unemployment  accounting 
is the possibility of extracting  a message for policymakers.  One temp- 
tation  is to leap from  Coen and  Hickman's  finding  that  unemployment  is 
due to a demand  gap to the conclusion that aggregate  demand  manage- 
ment is called for. The companion  temptation  is to conclude that a real 
wage gap may call for other sorts of policies. Unfortunately, in the 
absence of an explicit model as to how policy operates, neither  of these 
conclusions may be warranted.  Output may be below potential, and 
there may be limited scope for demand management.  Alternatively, 
there may be a wage gap that is fully curable by aggregate  demand 
management.  Robert Solow, for example, has provided  an illustrative 
model in which the real wage is too high at the same time that output  is 
below potential but where expansionary  monetary  policy can cure all 
gaps.' 
On  balance,  then, while tantalizingly  interesting,  the sorts  of numbers 
presented  by Coen and Hickman  need to be supplemented  with more 
structure  to make them fully interpretable  and more useful for policy 
purposes. 
1. Robert  M. Solow, "Unemployment:  Getting  the Questions  Right," Economica, 
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James Tobin: In the best Brookings Panel tradition, this paper is 
motivated by crucial current issues of macroeconomic  diagnosis and 
prescription  and brings sophisticated  analytical  and empirical  tools to 
bear on them. Is the high unemployment  of the 1980s "classical" or 
"Keynesian"?  Is it attributable  to stubbornly  excessive real  wages? Or 
to shortfalls  in effective demand?  Would  expansionary  fiscal and mon- 
etary  policies  just cause inflation?  Or  would they add to real output  and 
employment?  These timely  questions  are especially  relevant  to Europe, 
but they apply  also to Japan,  where the unemployment  is disguised,  and 
to the United States, where the economy has settled into rates of 
unemployment  and  excess capacity  higher  than  those in  previous  cyclical 
recoveries. 
I applaud  Coen  and  Hickman  for  their  audacious  and  ingenious  attempt 
to quantify  concepts so important  in macroeconomic  theory  and  policy, 
especially  because  they confirm  my own priors  that  most unemployment 
beyond the rates of the late 1970s  is Keynesian. 
Those bouquets are a sincere prelude to the doubts I am about to 
express. 
Do the authors  really answer the questions that concern  policymak- 
ers? The Euro-pessimists  or Euro-hypochondriacs  forswear demand 
stimulus because they believe it will be inflationary.  They think that 
businesses require higher profit margins to expand production, that 
workers won't permit them, that unions will demand still higher real 
wage rates if prosperity enhances their bargaining  power, that the 
NAIRU has shifted  many  points in the wrong  direction.  Sometimes  the 
European  position  appears  to be that  demand  expansion  is inflation-safe 
only if it is naturally generated by export markets or spontaneous 
domestic  demand,  never if it is contrived  by government. 
The authors'  findings  will not reassure  Euro-pessimists  who think  like 
that. Coen and Hickman  tell them they have a lot of Keynesian unem- 
ployment-the  more so because some is "hidden"-but  they cannot 
assure them that Keynesian remedies will be  noninflationary.  The 
authors' full employment, which corresponds to their "natural-rate" 
unemployment,  is not the NAIRU. I endorse  the distinction  in principle, 
without understanding  why the 3 percent unemployment  rate of males 
aged  forty-five  to fifty-four  in 1956  is the benchmark  for  full employment 
in the United States. The authors do not say what would happen to 
money  wages, real  wages, and  prices  if demand  stimulus  were  undertaken 
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because they show there is plenty of room in the economies they study 
to enable production  to respond to demand. But they don't dispel the 
fears of sectoral bottlenecks, structural  rigidities, and distributional 
conflicts that Euro-pessimists  cite as obstacles to noninflationary  mac- 
roeconomic  expansion. 
What  is missing  from  the authors'  model  is a relationship  between the 
Bruno-Sachs  wage gap and the Okun output gap. Coen and Hickman 
decompose shortfalls  in employment  and production  into classical and 
Keynesian components. Their additive decomposition is simple and 
neat, and their idea that the two types of unemployment  can coexist is 
appealing. But the implication that the demand constraint could be 
removed  without  affecting  the real  wage is suspect. 
I sketched  above the likely suspicions  of a Euro-pessimist.  A General 
Theory  Keynesian might have quite the opposite suspicion. He could 
say that the real wage is high because demand is short. Thanks to 
competition  among  employers, even when there is an overall effective 
demand  constraint,  workers  lucky enough  to have  jobs are  paid  far  more 
than  their  reservation  wages. Expansion  itself will dissipate  these rents. 
The unemployment  may look classical, but  the wage gap  is a mirage  that 
will vanish  en route  to prosperity. 
Which scenario, pessimistic or optimistic, applies to the countries 
and periods under study is an empirical  question. Theory tells us little 
about  relations  among  these variables  in disequilibrium.  Economic and 
political  institutions  matter, and the findings  are likely to differ  among 
national economies. Conventional  wisdom a few years ago was that 
nominal  wage inertia  characterized  the United States and United King- 
dom, while continental  European  economies suffered  from real wage 
inertia. Robert Gordon  questions that in a recent paper, and I will let 
him speak  for himself.  ' 
I allow myself a digression from the authors' text. The failure of 
inflation  to fall precipitously  in economies where unemployment  has 
been so high so long suggests to some observers that the NAIRU has 
risen many points. If you are sure of the slope of the short-run  Phillips 
curve, you will explain the slow attrition  of inflation  in the 1980s  by a 
large  adverse shift in the curve. The implication  is that demand  expan- 
sion, starting  from unemployment  rates around 10 percent, will accel- 
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erate prices. I find the conclusion unconvincing,  given the absence of 
recent  experience  with demand  expansion.  Maybe  the short-run  Phillips 
curve  is nearly  flat  in  the  previously  virgin  territory  of 1980s  observations; 
maybe  the paths  of wages and  prices are pretty  much  detached  from  the 
size of the Okun  gap. 
The  potential  output  path  is crucial  to the calculations  of the real  wage 
and  output  gaps and  of the decomposition  of unemployment  into the two 
types. The path, as I understand  it, is essentially a track familiar  in 
neoclassical  growth  theory  with one product  and  two factors, labor  and 
capital. Of the family of tracks consistent with the technology, the 
authors' path is the one that has an after-tax return on capital of 6 
percent. The related "rental cost of capital" is, however, not strictly 
constant but varies with the tax treatment  of depreciation  and invest- 
ment. It is gratuitously  assumed that saving would always match the 
capital  accumulation  implied  by the path. 
The uniqueness  of the potential  output  path and the neglect of the IS 
equation  seem to me to limit  the usefulness  of the paper  for policy. How 
demand  stimuli  might  eliminate  Keynesian  unemployment,  and  how the 
mix of monetary  and fiscal policy might  affect potential  output, cannot 
be analyzed. I should  think  that how the capital  investment  implied  by 
the authors' model is financed  would affect real interest rates and the 
growth  path  itself. 
The authors' potential output does not depend upon the history of 
actual output. No matter  how much and how long actual output falls 
short, its shadow marches on in splendid detachment. The authors 
blithely  observe that deficiencies  of capital  and labor  inputs  can always 
be repaired  in the future.  Here again,  the absence of a saving  function  is 
crippling.  It may or may not be so that savers, as well as investors, will 
eventually  accumulate  wealth  and  capital  to the same  multiples  of poten- 
tial  output  whether  interrupted  by recessions and  depressions  or  not. But 
surely  after  a decade  of stagnation  it would  take  a long  time  to build  a capi- 
tal stock of normal  size. Presumably  there  would also be lasting  damage 
to human  capital. Now that the profession has rediscovered  the fancy 
word  hysteresis, it is respectable  to mention  effects of this kind. 
The model assumes constant-returns-to-scale  Cobb-Douglas  tech- 
nology, with capital exponent a. and Hicks-neutral  progress at rate P, 
thus Harrod-neutral labor augmentation at rate ,/(1  -  cx).  Neither  ,  nor 
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exogenous  input  that  drives  the growth  of potential  output  is augmented 
labor. The equilibrium  capital stock along the path corresponds  to the 
ratio k* (my notation) of capital to augmented labor that yields the 
required  rental.  This ratio  will be roughly  constant. 
The same  k*  determines  the near-constant  real  wage w*  (my  notation) 
of augmented  labor,  from  which can be derived  the real  wage for natural 
labor, growing at rate  3/(l -  a.). The w* path could be regarded as the 
reference  path  for  calculating  the wage  gap  and  classical  unemployment. 
Suppose the actual productivity-adjusted  wage w is higher than w*. 
Assume with the authors  that the supply of savings is perfectly elastic 
so that the rental  cost of capital  q (the authors'  q, not mine) stays put. 
We know that in Cobb-Douglas  technology k =  [o/(1  - o)](wlq), and of 
course k* =  [o/(1  - o)](w*Iq).  A higher wage-rental  ratio requires a 
proportionately  higher k and implies less L or more K for any given 
output. 
The cost-minimizing  response  of a typical  firm  to a 1  percent  increase 
in the wage-rental  ratio  is, as  just argued,  to raise k over k*  by 1  percent. 
Producing  the same output  as before, the firm  would use (1 - a.)  percent 
more  capital  and  a.  percent  less labor.  The latter  is the authors'  estimate 
of the classical unemployment  due to the rise in the wage relative  to the 
rental  cost of capital.  But it is not the profit-maximizing  solution.  At that 
output,  the firm  would  be making  losses unless the product  price  rose by 
(1 - a.)  percent  relative  to both the new wage w and  the rental  q. In terms 
of product, the wage gap would be only cx  percent, and the rental cost 
would have fallen by (1 - cx)  percent. It is hard  to conceive a model of 
saving  and  investment  that  would, with  income unchanged  and  capital's 
return  lower, provide  the additional  capital  in the short  or long run. 
The  response  of employment  to a real  wage  increase  involves not only 
substitution  of capital  relative  to labor  (higher  k) but also adjustment  of 
output. Economists who have emphasized the recent importance  of 
classical  unemployment  have argued  that  excessive real  wages limit  the 
supply  of output  even when it is below potential. Were there a positive 
wage gap at or below full-employment  equilibrium,  firms  would find it 
unprofitable  to produce  that much output  and offer that much employ- 
ment. In contrast, profitability  is not an effective constraint in the 
authors'  model;  output  is always constrained  by demand. 
An easy way to see this difference in the role of profitability  is to 
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conceived by the authors, classical unemployment  would be zero. An 
increase  in the real  wage would simply  drive  up the rental  cost of capital 
until  firms  desired  to produce  the fixed,  demand-constrained  output  with 
the same  input  of labor,  that  is, until  the incentive  to substitute  one factor 
for the other was removed. Of course, if firms  were  just breaking  even 
before  the wage  increase,  they would  now be running  losses. The authors 
assume  that  somehow  firms  will  find  it profitable  at the margin  to produce 
up to the demand  constraint. 
Traditional  classical  unemployment,  on the other  hand,  would  be very 
large.  Profitability,  not demand,  would  become the effective constraint. 
Full profit-maximizing  adjustment  to a 1 percent real wage increase 
would require  a decrease of 1/a percent  in employment  and of (1 - cx)/cx 
percent in output-4  percent and 3 percent, respectively, with the 
authors'  estimate  of cx,  0.25. It is in the nature  of classical  unemployment, 
in contrast to Keynesian unemployment,  that it is due to real wage 
rigidity, so that a rise in the nominal price of output offers no escape 
from  this scenario. 
In general, the relationship  between output  prices and capital  goods 
prices  must  be made  explicit. In  a one-product  model, capital  investment 
is simply  one use of current  output,  which otherwise  can be consumed. 
Movements  in the product  price do not alter  the rental  cost of capital.  If 
operation  of the existing capital stock is unprofitable,  accumulation  of 
capital  will be unprofitable.  As the stock is run down by depreciation, 
further  reductions  in output and employment  will occur. A two-sector 
model, distinguishing  capital goods production  from consumer goods 
production,  would be a cleaner way to proceed. The authors' use of 
capital goods prices as numeraire  leads to confusion in defining  wage 
gaps. 
Classical  unemployment  has traditionally  meant  not  just rigidly  high 
real wages but also concurrent shortage of capital and, in a closed 
economy, of accumulated  savings. Coen and  Hickman  simply  wave that 
constraint  away. If the capital  stock can be assumed  to adjust  as needed 
to preserve output in the face of a wage gap, why not go further  and 
assume it can adjust enough to preserve employment? A  1 percent 
increase in K, with appropriate  reduction in capital cost to preserve 
profitability,  would validate  the 1 percent  increase  in the real wage with 
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Suppose the economy shows by the authors'  calculations  both kinds 
of unemployment.  The authors say that demand  stimulus  can remedy 
the Keynesian  unemployment  while  the wage  gap  remains.  Their  decom- 
position of unemployment  assumes that during  the demand  and output 
expansion, capital accumulation  will be greater  than in the absence of 
the wage gap. Investment will include "deepening," substitution of 
capital  for labor, as well as "widening." This scenario  is not subject  to 
my objection above if the expansion itself can generate  the necessary 
extra saving. That depends on the nature of the demand stimulus; a 
Reagan-Volcker  fiscal-monetary  mix could hardly  be expected to do the 
job. On the investment side, one might doubt that in times of excess 
capacity  and  high  real  wages  businesses  will  feel prepared  both  to expand 
capacity  and  to install  labor-saving  equipment. 
A specific problem  the authors  faced was to modify their potential 
output  track  to allow  for the impact  of the energy  shock of 1973-74.  I am 
mystified by their resolution of this problem. One obvious step is to 
reduce the estimated rate of progress c  in the production  function to 
allow  for the lower  growth  of productivity  observed, whatever  its cause, 
after 1974. An additional  possibility would be a one-shot reduction  in 
the scale constant  A in the production  function. However, it is not clear 
to me why an increase  in the relative  price  of oil and  energy  should  lower 
the capacity  of domestic industries,  including  energy  producers,  to add 
value at constant  prices. I don't see the relevance  of the adverse shift  in 
external terms of trade. I don't see why a jump in energy prices is 
modeled as a jump in capital goods prices necessitating  a once-for-all 
decline in potential output in order to maintain  the required  return  on 
capital. 
In effect, what the authors  appear  to have introduced  is a direct  one- 
shot 7 percent downward  adjustment  of the equilibrium  product  wage. 
The result  is a larger  wage gap and classical unemployment,  despite the 
fact that in the United States actual  real wages, whether  in terms of the 
authors'  numeraire,  capital  goods, or of consumer  goods, were falling 
significantly.  It is neither contradictory  to the authors' own concepts 
nor  otherwise  unreasonable  to regard  much  of the unemployment  in the 
United States in 1976-82 as Keynesian rather  than  classical unemploy- 
ment,  tolerated  and  generated  by the monetary  authorities  to oppose the 
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The authors say that their model is based on imperfect, not pure, 
competition.  Operationally,  this is their  justification  for deriving  factor 
demands  from cost minimization  rather  than profit  maximization,  and 
for assuming  firms  are always demand-constrained. 
I conjecture  that Coen and  Hickman  have in mind  something  like the 
following  as the  way  imperfect  competition  enters  their  model  of potential 
output:  a typical  firm,  a price-setter  in product  markets  but a price-taker 
in factor  markets,  does not equate  the marginal  product  (MP)  of labor  to 
the real  wage or the MP of capital  to its rental  cost. The firm  equates  the 
marginal  revenue  product  of each factor to its price. The MRP in each 
case is MPI(1  + ,u),  where pL  is the markup  in proportion  to marginal  cost. 
For the long-run  calculations relevant to the growth track, constant 
returns to scale imply that marginal  cost equals average cost and is 
constant. The markup pL  can also be  identified as  the  "degree of 
monopoly" and is equal to -  1/(1  + q), where -q  (< -  1) is the elasticity 
of demand  for the firm's  product  with respect to its relative  price. For 
the short  run,  the authors  assume a markup  over labor  cost alone. Since 
wage cost is normally  a fraction  (1 - a.)  of total  cost per  worker,  I suppose 
this markup is (.  +  I)/(q  + a). 
These markups,  related  to the degree of monopoly, bring  monopoly- 
rent incomes. They would have to be taken into account in a complete 
model, particularly  in relation to consumption, saving, and taxation. 
However, a serious imperfect-competition  model would not assume 
constant  returns  to scale for an individual  firm.  It would assume  instead 
that a firm has increasing returns because of fixed costs required  to 
establish  and maintain  product  differentiation.  Then the markups  could 
be partially  or wholly swallowed by those costs, as in Chamberlinian 
monopolistic  competition. 
In distinguishing  their model from other disequilibrium  macroeco- 
nomic models, the authors  assert, "Keynesian and classical unemploy- 
ment  may  coexist rather  than  occurring  in separate  regimes.  " Evidently, 
a separate  classical regime  is ruled out by the assumption  of imperfect 
competition, since firms are always constrained  by effective demand, 
with  price  exceeding  marginal  cost. Even in  full-employment  equilibrium 
such a firm  would  want to satisfy at prevailing  prices additional  demand 
due to an outward  shift of its demand  curve. But if all firms,  all typical, 
tried to do so,  the aggregate supply constraint would bind. It, not 
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the purely  competitive  model. There  too, given constant  returns  to scale 
within firms  or by multiplication  of firms, output will respond to new 
demand  at  prevailing  prices  if and  only if economywide  resource  supplies 
permit. Likewise in both cases individual  firms  may or may not be in 
local marginal-revenue-equals-marginal-cost  situations. 
Macroeconomic  disequilibrium  models, whatever their microfoun- 
dations, should  not suggest  that  outputs  and sales of individual  firms  are 
rationed. Both demand and supply constraints should be modeled as 
economywide  limits that lead individual  firms  to decide not to produce 
or sell more. 
My final comment refers to the authors' model of adjustments  of 
employment and capital stock to their desired values. They talk of 
adjustment  costs but  do not explicitly  introduce  them.  They use separate 
annual  rates of stock adjustment  for the two inputs. The desired stocks 
toward  which the firm  moves are derived  from  current  values of output 
(demand)  and factor prices, even though the firm  will not reach those 
targets  for many years. The labor  adjustment  is the faster, but it surely 
does not minimize  costs along the way to employ labor  as if the capital 
adjustment  were complete  when in fact it is not. An attractive  feature  of 
the model is the explicit distinction between numbers  employed and 
hours of work. Why can't short-run  adjustment  of labor  input  be made 
in hours of work? Surely  the proper  strategy  is to find  a desired  path of 
employment,  hours,  and  investment,  given  the expected  path  of demand, 
such that the present value of costs, production  plus adjustment,  is 
minimized. 
General  Discussion 
Robert  Gordon  questioned  the very low natural  rates of unemploy- 
ment  calculated  for the three  European  countries  by Coen  and  Hickman. 
He argued  for  defining  the natural  rate  of unemployment  as the  NAIRU- 
the rate consistent with steady inflation-rather than in terms of labor 
market  efficiency as the authors  attempt  to do. His own estimates for 
Europe as a whole based on wage and price equations show the 1984 
natural  rate  to be in the vicinity of 6.0 to 6.5 percent, rather  than  the 1.0 
to 2.0 percent  Coen and  Hickman  assume  for Germany,  Austria,  and  the 
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Katharine  Abraham suggested that the authors' estimates of the 
natural  rate should consider factors other than demographics  that may 
have affected  the volume of frictional  unemployment.  She noted that  in 
the United States and the United Kingdom, the inverse relationship 
between prime-age  male unemployment  and vacancies has shifted out- 
wards over time, suggesting  that, at least in these two countries, other 
sources of frictional  unemployment  have grown  in importance. 
Edmund  Phelps explained  why, even if one agreed  with the authors 
that Keynesian  shocks generally  explain  the lion's share  of employment 
fluctuations,  it does not follow from  their  analysis  that  the severe 1980s 
slump in Europe is predominantly  Keynesian in origin. The derived 
demand  for labor  curve to which Coen and Hickman  refer-their LD- 
may have shifted down in this decade due to the increased markup 
desired by customer-market  firms  in response to the sharp  rise in real 
interest  rates, as argued  in a recent paper  by Phelps and J.-P. Fitoussi, 
rather  than  because of Keynesian  shocks.  ' 
Gordon remarked that the absence of  dynamic wage and price 
equations  limits  the usefulness of Coen and Hickman's  approach.  Even 
though  current  real  wages may not be far  out of line, they may  have been 
reduced  in response  to economic slack. Policymakers  may  fear  that  they 
would rise sharply  if aggregate  demand  were now stimulated. 
Martin  Baily  commented  that  the  authors'  decomposition  of "excess" 
unemployment  into classical and Keynesian components is extremely 
sensitive to assumptions  about  what  is fixed  and  what  is allowed  to vary. 
As Coen and  Hickman  note in their  paper,  in a simple  model  with Cobb- 
Douglas  production  and  no adjustment  lags, the output-constant  elastic- 
ity of demand  for labor  equals  the inverse of capital's  share  if the capital 
stock is assumed  fixed, but equals  capital's share  if the rate of return  on 
capital is held constant while the capital stock is allowed to vary. If 
capital's share is assumed to be about 0.25, the demand for labor is 
sixteen times more elastic under the first assumption  than under the 
second. 
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